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INTERNALIZING EUROPEAN COURT OF
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RUSSIA'S COURTS OF GENERAL




ver the past several years, Russia's courts of general jurisdiction
(Ordinary Courts) have made significant changes in Russia's sys-
tem of civil defamation law.' In February 2005, utilizing its power to
issue interpretations of legislation, the Supreme Court of the Russian
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Law (particularly Kristin Delaney and Aaron Warshaw) for their excellent work on this
manuscript.
1. For this paper, I will use the following definition of defamation: the private law
(civil) system of legal protection, providing post-dissemination remedies including mone-
tary compensation, against dissemination of false communications that harm individual
reputation. This definition is based on the provisions of the system for protection of
"Honor, Dignity, and Business Reputation" found in the Civil Code of the Russian Fed-
eration. See discussion infra Part IV.A.I.a. See also G.M. REZNIK & K.I SKLOVSKII,
CHEST'. DOSTOINSTOVO. DELOVAIA REPUTATSIIA: SPORY S UCHASTIEM SMI [HONOR.
DIGNITY. BuSINESS REPUTATION: DISPUTES INVOLVING MASS INFORMATION MEDIA]
(Moscow: Statut, 2006) and the definition of "defamation" [diffimatsiia] in S.V. Potap-
enko, Diffamatsiia i rossiiskaiia sudebnaia praktika v kontekste opyta Evropeiskogo suda
po pravam cheloveka [Defamation and Russian judicial practice in the context of the
experience of the European Court of Human Rights] in 43 EVROPEISKII SUD PO PRAVAM
CHELOVEKA I ZASHCHITA SVOBODY SLOVA V RoSSII: PRETSEDENTY, ANALIZ,
REKOMENDATSIU, (G.V. Vinokurov, A.G. Rikhter & V.V. Chernyshov eds., Institut prob-
lem informatsionnogo prava, 2004), available at bttp://www.medialaw.ru/
article 10/7/15.htm.
Defamation is one within a larger category of legal actions recognized in many
European legal systems, including Russia's, for protection of individual personality
rights, including individual reputation, dignity, and privacy. For example, in Russia the
legal action of insult, separate from defamation with distinct elements, protects individual
dignity against offensive statements. Regarding insult in the Russian legal system, see
discussion infra note 83 and accompanying text. Because of the close relationship be-
tween defamation and insult, this article will examine aspects of both, but with far greater
emphasis on the former. The article will not address the defamation provisions in Rus-
sia's Criminal Code, which have remained outside the scope of the re-assessment process
examined herein.
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Federation (SC) consolidated and made generally applicable throughout
the ordinary court system a set of modifications, 2 a number of which cer-
tain lower courts had already applied in adjudication of discrete disputes.
The simultaneous threshold steps in this process were the courts' expan-
sion of the range of applicable sources of law beyond the Russian Fed-
eration Civil Code to include free expression guarantees in the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)3-- an international treaty to which
Russia acceded in 1998-and their internalization of the interpretative
practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Although it will examine closely certain lower court decisions that
foreshadowed and accompanied the SC's 2005 Explanation, this Article
is not a comprehensive empirical study of the operation of Russian civil
defamation law.4 Instead, the Article will focus on three inter-related in-
quiries: (1) the recent changes effected in civil defamation law and prac-
tice; (2) the nature of the judicial process of internalizing ECtHR inter-
pretive practice; and (3) the potential implications for further develop-
ment of the new approaches and expansion of their scope.
These developments have taken place within a context of intense ex-
ternal and internal scrutiny of the Russian legal system, particularly the
ordinary courts, and the status of news media freedoms in Russia. For
example, when Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996, consider-
able skepticism was voiced about its ability to meet its membership obli-
gations, particularly those under the ECHR.5 Much of this skepticism
2. See Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation] 2005, No. 4, p. 2, (Postanovlenie No. 3 Plenuma Verkhovnogo
Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 24 Fevralia 2005 g. "0 sudebnoi praktike po delam o zash-
chite chesti i dostoinstva grazhdan, a takzhe delovoi reputatsii grazhdan i iuridicheskikh
lits" [Decree No. 3 of the Plenum of the Russian Federation Supreme Court dated Febru-
ary 24, 2005 "Concerning judicial practice in disputes regarding protection of individual
honor and dignity, as well as the business reputation of physical and legal persons"]),
available at http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt detale.php?id=2536 [hereinafter 2005 Ex-
p lanation].
3. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/
QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG [hereinafter ECHR]. The ECHR entered into
force on September 3, 1953. Id.
4. In contrast, see the richly detailed empirical study of defamation law in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, in Benjamin Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An
Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 33 (2006).
5. The ECHR makes clear that the primary responsibility for its observance lies with
the domestic legal systems of the member states themselves. ECHR, supra note 3, art. 1.
Russia's entry was accompanied by considerable doubt within the Council of
Europe as to its readiness. The entry resolution was approved by the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on January 25, 1996-of 263 deputies, 214
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centered on the ordinary courts and their perceived inexperience or in-
ability to apply effectively constitutional provisions dictating the direct
applicability and direct effect of Russia's international human rights trea-
ties. 6 Severe criticism of Russia's human rights record has continued,
with much of it directed at concerns about freedom of the press. These
expressions of concern, in turn, often have singled out the system of civil
defamation.7
participated in the voting, with 164 voting to approve, 35 against, and 15 abstaining.
Even more reflective of skepticism were the various Council of Europe reports at this
time. See Mark Janis, Russia and the 'Legality' of Strasbourg Law, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 93,
98 (1997), available at http://www.ejil.org/journalVVol8/Nol/art5.html ("[G]iven Rus-
sia's lack of experience in protecting human rights at the level of municipal law, it is
likely that a great many violations of European human rights law will be committed
there, and that they will not be remedied domestically."); Maxim Ferschtman, Russia, in
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ITS MEMBER STATES, 1950-2000, 731, 731-35 (Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz,
eds. 2001); J.D. Kahn, Russia's "Dictatorship of Law" and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 29 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L., 1, 3-4 (2004).
6. Gennady M. Danilenko, Implementation of International Law in CIS States: The-
ory and Practice, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 51, 58 (1999), available at
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Voll0/Nol/ab3.html [hereinafter Danilenko, Implementation
of International Law] (The ordinary courts "have much less experience in applying inter-
national law than does the [Russian Federation] Constitutional Court."); Gennady M.
Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 451,
464, 466, 470 (1994) [hereinafter Danilenko, New Russian Constitution]. See also Tarja
Lngstrom, TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 430-31 (Martti
Koskenniemi, ed., 2003).
7. In a March 2006 report on the status of defamation laws in the member states of
the Council of Europe, the Council's Steering Committee on the Media and New Com-
munication Services stated the following concerning Russia:
Articles 151 and 152 of the Civil Code and Articles 129 and 130 of the Crimi-
nal Code are still being used by public figures in order to intimidate or silence
hostile media. They are a serious impediment to the practice of investigative
journalism, with its potential to publicise and thus to reduce incidents of cor-
ruption and wrongdoing in public life.
Council of Europe, Steering Committee on the Media and New Communication Services
(CDMC): Examination of the Alignment of the Laws on Defamation with the Relevant
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, Including the Issue of Decriminalisa-
tion of Defamation, Doc. No. CDMC(2005)007 (Mar. 15, 2006), at 95, available at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/humanrights/media/l IntergovernmentalCo-operation/CDMC/
CDMC%282005%29007 en.pdf.
In June 2005, PACE issued a report on the status of human rights protection in
Russia. Sections 389-393 addressed defamation law. Section 389 stated in full:
We are concerned by the current defamation legislation and its application by
the Russian judiciary and executive powers. Journalists are often prosecuted
2006]
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These challenges have included external and internal litigation. Exter-
nally, in July 2005, the ECtHR, ruled for the first time on a Russian
defamation case, holding that Russia had violated the free expression
guarantees in Article 10 of the ECHR.8 The ECtHR also has found ad-
missible at least seven other applications challenging ordinary court
defamation decisions.9 Internally, lawyers representing journalist and
media entity defendants at the national and local levels l have made con-
through libel suits (approximately 8-10,000 lawsuits a year). As reported by
the Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situations, the number of prosecutions of
journalists has increased significantly as from 2000. 49 criminal cases were
opened in 2002 and, on average, 30-35 criminal proceedings were instituted
against journalists in 2003-2004.
EUR. PARL. Ass., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation,
Doc. 10568, 389 (2005), cited in EUR. PARE. Ass. RES. 1455 n.1 (June 22, 2005), avail-
able at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/taO5/ERES
1455.htm [hereinafter Honouring of Obligations].
For recent pessimistic assessments of the state of media freedoms in Russia, see
INT'L RESEARCH & EXCHANGES BOARD [IREX], MEDIA SUSTAINABILITY INDEX 2005 183-
91 (2005), available at http://www.irex.org/programs/MSIEUR/2005/MS105-
Russia.pdf, and Andrei Richter, Opportunities Lost, THE Moscow TIMES, June 5, 2006,
available at http://themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/06/05/006.html (access requires
payment, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
8. Grinberg v. Russia, App. No. 23472/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
9. The ECtHR found four applications admissible on December 9, 2004: Godlevskiy
v. Russia, App. No. 14888/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Krasulya v. Russia, App. No.
12365/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Porubova v. Russia, App. No. 8237/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2004); and Zakharov v. Russia, App. No. 14881/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). The ECtHR
also ruled the following applications admissible: Chemodurov v. Russia, App. No.
72683/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Filatenko v. Russia, App. No. 73219/01, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2004); and Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia, App. No. 25698/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). The
decisions on the merits in all of these cases are pending as of mid-July 2006.
For discussion of the presentation of Russian mass media law cases to the ECtHR,
see Viktor Monakhov, Strasburg kak novaia tochka opory v dele zashehity rossiiskoi
svobody massovoi informatsii [Strasbourg as the new fulcrum in the defense of freedom
of mass information in Russia], ZAKONODATEL'STVO I PRAKTIKA MASS-MEDIA [LAW AND
PRACTICE IN MASS MEDIA], Feb. 2006, http://www.medialaw.ru/publications
/zip/] 38/6.htm.
10. A number of these lawyers work on behalf of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). In January 2006, President Vladimir Putin signed legislation that imposes new
requirements and limitations on NGO's. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation], 2006, No. 3, Item 282. For a
description and critical analysis by one NGO representative (Coordinator of the Moscow
Office of the Heritage Foundation), see Yevgeny Volk, Russia's NGO Law: An Attack on
Freedom and Civil Society (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm I090.cfm.
It is difficult at this point to assess the impact of this legislation on matters related
to the subjects of this article. Was defamation, or legal matters generally, a concern of
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certed efforts to present spirited defenses, including abundant references
to ECtHR practice, in defamation litigation."
At their core, the vocal criticisms and legal challenges to the operation
of Russian civil defamation law have centered on two questions that in
these particular circumstances became closely intertwined: (1) a defama-
tion law doctrinal question concerning identification of the applicable
sources of law; and (2) a constitutional law question concerning the do-
mestic incorporation of international treaty norms and the internalization
of ECtHR interpretations of the ECHR in particular.' 2 These issues will
be the topic of Parts III-IV of this Article, which follow a description of
the ordinary court system in Part II. Part V will describe the most signifi-
cant practical applications of the new, multi-source system of civil defa-
mation law, and Part VI will examine the potential implications of the
new approach, including the SC's mandate that the ordinary courts "take
Russia's lawmakers in enacting this legislation? Is defamation (or law generally) distant
enough from more immediate political concerns? These considerations must remain out-
side the scope of this article.
11. See infra notes 120 & 196 and accompanying text.
12. 1 refer to this as a constitutional law question because the Constitution, Article
15(4), serves as the conduit for incorporation of international treaty norms in the Russian
legal system. See discussion infra note 98 and accompanying text.
While there is a rapidly expanding literature on the domestic incorporation of
international norms, see, e.g., W.E. Butler, National Treaty Law: Russia, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 537-80 (Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee, & L. Ben-
jamin Ederington eds., 2005), the domestic legal effect of extra-national judicial interpre-
tation of those norms has received comparably less attention. See generally Mohammed
Bedjaoui, The Reception by National Courts of Decisions of International Tribunals, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 21 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory
H. Fox, eds., 1996); Sarita Ordonez & David Reilly, Effect of Jurisprudence of the Inter-
national Court of Justice on National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS 335 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox, eds., 1996). As to Russia
and the legal effect of ECtHR interpretations of the ECHR, see M.N. Marchenko, luridi-
cheskaia priroda i kharakter reshenii Evropeiskogo Suda po pravam cheloveka [Legal
nature and character of European Court of Human Rights decisions], GoS. I PRAvo, Feb.
2006, at 11; V.D. Zor'kin, Konstitutsionnyi sud Rossii v evropeiskom pravovom pole [The
Russian Constitutional Court in the European legal sphere], ZH.R.P., Mar. 2005, at 3, 7-
9; Anna Valentinovna Demeneva, luridicheskie posledstviia postanovlenii Evropeiskogo
suda po pravam cheloveka dlia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Legal consequences for the Russian
Federation of European Court of Human Rights judgments] (2004) (unpublished Master
of Laws dissertation, Urals State Legal Academy, Ekaterinburg, Russia) (on file with the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law); V.A. Kanashevskii, Pretsedentnaia praktika
Evropeiskogo suda po pravam cheloveka kak reguliator grazhdanskikh otnoshenii v Ros-
siiskoi Federatsii [Precedential practice of the European Court of Human Rights as a
regulator of civil relations in the Russian Federation], ZH.R.P., Apr. 2003, at 122.
2006]
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into account" ECtHR practice in their decision-making, 13 for remaining
defamation law issues.
II. THE ORDINARY COURTS
The ordinary court system is the largest of the three parallel branches
of the federal judicial system in Russia, the other two being the Constitu-
tional Court of the Russian Federation (CC) and the Arbitrazh (or com-
mercial) courts. 14 With certain exceptions not relevant to this Article,1
5
all courts in Russia are part of the federal judiciary.'
6
With the exception of the SC in Moscow at its apex, the ordinary court
system is organized on a territorial basis, with separate hierarchical struc-
tures within each of the eighty-nine component units (Subjects) of the
Russian Federation. 7 Within the Subjects, the lowest level courts are the
justice of the peace courts, whose limited competence does not include
the adjudication of defamation disputes.'g Above these courts in the hier-
archy are the district courts, which usually function as courts of first in-
stance in disputes outside the competence of the justice of the peace
courts, and as appellate bodies for decisions by those courts.' 9 The high-
est level bodies, the Subject-level courts, 20 are divided into civil and
13. For further discussion on the "take into account" directive, see infra Part IV.B.2.
14. For detailed descriptions of the judicial system in Russia, including aspects dis-
cussed throughout Part II, see WILLIAM BURNHAM, PETER B. MAGGS & GENNADY M.
DANILENKO, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 49-129 (3d ed.,
2004) [hereinafter BURNHAM ET AL.]; WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RussiAN LAW (2d ed. 2003);
and Peter Krug, Departure from the Centralized Model: The Russian Supreme Court and
Constitutional Control of Legislation, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 725, 729-33 (1997) [hereinafter
Krug, Departure].
15. The Subjects (federal units) of the Russian Federation may establish their own
constitutional, or "Charter," courts, which have jurisdiction to review the compatibility of
Subject legislation and sub-legislative acts with Subject Constitutions or Charters.
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 41, 54-56. In addition, the Subjects may establish
"Justice of the Peace" courts, which occupy the lowest level of the ordinary court system.
Id.
16. Id. at 52-54.
17. id. at 73-77; Krug, Departure, supra note 14, at 731-33. Under Article 65 of the
Constitution, the various Subjects have different designations. For example, among other
designations, twenty-one Subjects are named "Republics," forty-nine others are "Re-
gions" [oblasti], and two (Moscow and St, Petersburg) are "Federal Cities." BURNHAM
ET AL., supra note 14, at 41, 75; Butler, supra note 14, at 159-60; and Krug, Departure,
supra note 14, at 725 n.l.
18. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 55-56, 73-74.
19. Id. at 74-75.
20. The Subject-level courts have different names, depending on the type of Subject
in which they are located. In Republics of the Russian Federation, they are called su-
preme courts (of the particular Republic). In the two federal cities, Moscow and St. Pe-
[Vol. 32:1
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criminal chambers. Although they operate as first instance courts in cer-
tain categories of disputes, these Subject-level courts serve primarily as
appellate bodies for decisions from the district courts.2 1 Each of the latter
courts also has a Presidium, a body made up of the President and certain
other judges of the subject-level court, which is empowered in certain
circumstances to review decisions of the civil and criminal chambers.
22
In the 1990s, the ordinary courts became the leading arena for exami-
nation of doctrinal issues in civil defamation law.23 They continue to play
this role today, due in large part to the allocation of judicial competence
in Russia.
A. The Allocation of Judicial Competence
The ordinary courts have competence over all matters not allocated ex-
clusively to the CC or the Arbitrazh courts.24 The Arbitrazh courts have
exclusive competence over disputes involving one or more parties en-
gaged in entrepreneurial and other forms of economic activity. As to ju-
risdiction over defamation disputes, the ordinary courts exercise compe-
tence over all cases except those that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Arbitrazh courts. 25 Some important and controversial litigation has
taken place in the Arbitrazh courts; however, little consideration of doc-
trinal questions has taken place in those courts.2
6
tersburg, they are "city courts." Most Subject-level courts are located in "regions" and
therefore are called "regional courts." Id.
21. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 75-76; Krug, Departure, supra note 14, at
731-32.
22. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 71.
23. Peter Krug, Civil Defamation Law and the Press in Russia: Private and Public
Interests, the 1995 Civil Code, and the Constitution, (pts. I & 2), 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 947 (1995), 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297 (1996).
24. On allocation of judicial competencies generally, see BURNHAM ET AL., supra note
14, at 50-52, 70, 73-78, 81-129. Regarding the CC's jurisdiction, see also T.G.
Morshchakova, Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation], in SUDEBNAIA VLAST' [THE JUDICIAL POWER], 336-342 (I.L.
Petrukhin ed., 2003).
25. The Arbitrazh Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, art. 33, para. 5, grants
the Arbitrazh courts competence over disputes "concerning the protection of business
reputation in the sphere of entrepreneurial and other economic activity." Arbitrazhno-
Protsessual'nyi Kodeks RF [Arbitrazh Procedure Code of the Russian Federation], Fed-
eral Law No. 95-FZ, Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2002, No. 30, Item 3012. The SC also confirmed
this grant of competence in the 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 3, which stated that this
competence is exclusive.
26. There is one exception to this statement. In the late 1990s, several decisions of the
Supreme Arbitrazh Court Presidium rejected legal persons' claims for monetary compen-
2006)
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Meanwhile, although the CC has competence to adjudicate individual
complaints alleging unconstitutionality of legislative acts, 27 it has not
ruled on substantive defamation law questions. This is because the CC
has viewed these as matters of judicial law application, and it lacks com-
petence to review the constitutionality of judicial acts.28 The CC has
sation for non-economic harm, ruling (in contrast to the Supreme Court) that a legal per-
son cannot experience the "pain and suffering" which is a prerequisite for the "moral
damages" remedy. However, in July 2005, a three-judge panel of the Supreme Arbitrazh
Court denied a petition that sought supervisory review by the Court's Presidium of lower
court decisions that granted the moral damages remedy to a legal person in the highly
visible case of Alfa Bank v. Kommersant. Al'fa Bank v. Kommersant (July 21, 2005) (on
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). The author is grateful to Dr. Andrei
Richter, Director of the Moscow Media Law and Policy Institute, for his assistance in
obtaining this judgment. Regarding the Alfa Bank litigation, see Peter Krug, Legal Per-
sons and Compensation for Harm to Business Reputation: The Civil Code, Judicial Prac-
tice, and Freedom of the Press, in REMAKING THE ROLE OF LAW: COMMERCIAL LAW
REFORM IN RUSSIA AND THE CIS, (Kathryn Hendley, ed., Juris Publications, forthcoming
2006) [hereinafter Krug, Harm to Business Reputation]. Regarding the moral damages
remedy, see discussion infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
27. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 125(4). This is a
power of concrete, not abstract, review: in other words, the complainant must show that
the legislative act in question was applied or would be applied in a discrete case. Absence
of precision in the constitutional text has yielded considerable controversy over the ques-
tion of whether the ordinary courts also have the power to hold legislative acts unen-
forceable in concrete cases because they conflict with the federal Constitution. See
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, 82-120; Krug, Departure, supra note 14.
28. The grant of competence to adjudicate individual complaints in Article 125(4) of
the Constitution is limited to review of legislative acts only, and no other constitutional
provision extends the CC's competence to review judicial acts. See Federal'nyi konstitut-
sionnyi zakon "0 Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii" [Federal Constitutional
Law "On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation"] Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1994, No.
13, Item 1447, art. 3, reprinted in 31 STATUTES AND DECISIONS: THE LAWS OF THE USSR
AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES, No. 4 (July/Aug. 1995) (S.J. Reynolds, ed.) [hereinafter, CC
Statute]. See also BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 82; Krug, Departure, supra note 14.
Thus, in this regard, the CC's powers are considerably more limited than those of its
leading model, the German Federal Constitutional Court, which includes review of judi-
cial acts within its competence. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 14-15 (2d ed. 1997).
In determining the constitutionality of a legislative act, the CC is authorized to
identify and take into account the ordinary courts' construction of that act as reflected in
its practice. CC Statute, supra, art. 74(2). The CC has used this provision to articulate
what it views as the constitutionally permissible interpretation of the legislative act in
question and to direct all law-applying agencies, including the ordinary courts, to employ
it in future adjudications even if it differs from the ordinary courts' construction. See,
e.g., the CC's February 27, 2003 Decree No. l-P, § 6, Sobranie Zakonadetl'stva Ros-
siiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 10,
[Vol. 32:1
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maintained this position since denying, on these grounds, the admissibil-
ity of a defamation defendant's complaint in 1995.9
Because the CC lacks authority to review judicial acts, and the Arbi-
trazh court system is completely separate from that of the ordinary
courts, the allocation of competencies ensures that the ordinary courts
have broad autonomy within their zone of competence to interpret and
apply the norms of international agreements to which Russia is a party.
This authority therefore extends to the ordinary courts' consideration of
international norms in their construction of domestic legislation.3 ° As a
result, as will be discussed below, the ordinary courts as a system have
been free to fashion their own approaches to the questions of the rela-
tionship between international norms, such as those in the ECHR and
domestic defamation law.
B. The Ordinary Courts and Judicial Authority
The judicial actions examined in this Article are of two types: (1) the
Supreme Court's issuance of abstract, generally applicable "Explana-
Item 953. However, whatever the degree of bindingness of such determinations, they do
not approximate a power to exercise repressive review and declare unenforceable discrete
ordinary court decisions.
29. Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 27 sentiabria 1995 g. N. 69-0 "Ob
otkaze v priniatii k rassmotreniiu zhaloby grazhdanina Kozyreva Andreia Vladimirovi-
cha" [Decision of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of September 27, 1995
"On denial of admission of the complaint of citizen Andrei Vladimirovich Kozvrev"],
VKS, June 2006, at 2, reprinted in Roz. GAz., Nov. 22, 1995, at 3, available at
http://www.ksrf.ru:8081/SESSION/S-oklOtZL3iPILOT/main.htm. For detailed discus-
sion, see Krug (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 303-07. See also Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo
Suda RF ot 27 Maia 2004 g. N. 186-0 "Ob otkaze v priniatii k rassmotreniiu zhaloby
grazhdanki Zarovniatnykh Eleny Nikolaevny na narushenie ee konstitutsionnykh prav
stat 'iami 297 i 298 Ugolovnogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii" [Decision of the Russian
Federation Constitutional Court of May 27, 2004 "On denial of admission of the com-
plaint of citizen Elena Nikolaevna Zarovniatnykh claiming violation of her constitutional
rights by Articles 297 and 298 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code"],
http://www.ksrf.ru:8081/SESSION/SYgrRccHv/PILOT/main.htm. In this decision, the
CC denied the admissibility, on grounds similar to those in Kozyrev, of a complaint chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Articles 297 ("Disrespect Toward the Court") and 298
("Defaming of Judges and Other Judicial Personnel") of the Criminal Code. Theoreti-
cally, the CC would be competent to review the constitutionality of the defamation legis-
lative base itself, but it did state in the Kozyrev decision (without making a formal deter-
mination) that the applicable Civil Code provisions appeared to have a constitutional
basis. To this author's knowledge, the CC since that time has not been presented with a
complaint alleging the unconstitutionality of the civil defamation legislative base itself.
30. In regard to the CC's authority under Article 74(2) of the CC Statute, supra note
28, it does not appear that the CC ever has invoked Article 74(2) to examine the confor-
mity to international treaty norms of ordinary court applications of legislative acts.
20061
BROOK. J INT'L L.
tions;" and (2) the adjudication by all ordinary courts of discrete dis-
putes.
1. Explanations of the SC
The SC's powers are multi-dimensional, 3' They include, in addition to
the SC's indirect influence over judges through the exercise of its admin-
istrative authority over the entire ordinary court system, 32 the issuance of
interpretive Explanations and powers of appellate and supervisory review
over discrete lower court decisions.33 For purposes of this Article, the
issuance of Explanations is the most important function: the SC's acts
most directly relevant to the development of civil defamation law were
all Explanations issued in 1992 (amended in 1993 and 1995),14 2003,'5
31. See BURNHAM ETAL., supra note 14, at 76-77.
32. See Krug, Departure, supra note 14, at 736-37.
33. Id. at 732-35.
34. Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda RF [BVS [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation] 1992, No. 11, p. 7, available at http://www.supcourt.rul
vscourt detale.php?id=889 (PostanovIenie Plenuma No. 11 ot 18 avgusta 1992 goda
Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii "0 nekotorykh voprosakh voznikshikh pri
rassmotrenii sudami del o zashchite chesti i dostoinstva grazhdan i iuridiheskikh fits"
[Decree No. 11 from 18 August 1992 of the Plenum of the Russian Federation Supreme
Court "Concerning Several Questions Arising in Consideration by the Courts of Cases
Concerning Defense of Honor and Dignity of Citizens and the Business Reputations of
Citizens and Businesses"]). Certain provisions of this Decree were amended in 1993 and
1995. For the 1993 amendments, see Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin
of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 1993, No. 3, p. 8, available at
http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt detale.php?id=919 (Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhov-
nogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii N. 11 ot 21 dekabria 1993 g. "0 dopolnenii i izmenenii
nekotorykh postanovlenii Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii" [Decree
No. 11 of the Plenum of the Russian Federation Supreme Court from 21 December 1993
"Concerning Additions and Amendments to Certain Decrees of the Plenum of the Rus-
sian Federation Supreme Court ]). For the 1995 amendments, see Biulleten' Verkhov-
nogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 1995,
No. 7, p. 4, available at http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt detale.php?id=4134 (Postanov-
lenie N. 6 Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 25 aprelia 1995 g. "0
vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v nekotorye postanovleniia Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda
Rossiiskoi Federatsii" [Decree No. 6 of the Plenum of the Russian Federation Supreme
Court from 25 April 1995 "Concerning the Insertion of Amendments and Additions into
Certain Decrees of the Plenum of the Russian Federation Supreme Court"]). Hereinafter,
the 1992 Decree and 1993 and 1995 amendments will be referred to collectively as the
"1992 Explanation."
35. Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation] 1995, No. 12, p. 3, available at http://www.supcourt.ru/
vscourt detale.php?id= 1961 (Postanovlenie N. 5 Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi
Federatsii ot 10 oktiabria 2003 g. "0 primenenii sudami obshchei iurisdiktsii ob-
shchepriznannykh printsipov i norm mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh dogo-
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and 2005.36 To this author's knowledge, the SC's last substantive adjudi-
cative decision in a discrete defamation law case was in 1997." 7
This interpretive function is vitally important for two reasons. 38 First, it
plays an important role in defining the normative base, serving as a gap-
filler to refine ambiguous or unaddressed questions in statutory texts.
Second, it serves as an integral means of promoting uniformity of deci-
sion-making throughout the vast ordinary court system.39 Explanations
are of great importance for the practice of the ordinary courts, which of-
ten cite to them in their decisions.4 °
Although debate remains on the question of whether the Explanations
constitute a binding source of law, it is apparent that consensus exists for
the proposition that they are, at the least, "an important and effective in-
strument of judicial power. '4 1 Thus, Explanations have direct, immedi-
ate, prospective effect throughout the entire ordinary court system.
vorov Rossiiskoi Federatsii" [Decree No. 5 of the Plenum of the Russian Federation Su-
preme Court "Concerning the Application by the Courts of General Jurisdiction of Gen-
erally-recognized Principles and Norms of International Law and International Treaties of
the Russian Federation"]) [hereinafter October 10, 2003 Explanation].
36. See 2005 Explanation, supra note 2.
37. This decision was the Vologda decision. See discussion infra note 108 and ac-
companying text. In 2003, however, the SC's Civil Chamber did address a Volgograd
Province law that imposed administrative sanctions for communications insulting local
public officials. The Chamber ruled that the lower court's application of the law was
unconstitutional because the law lacked sufficient clarity. In its decision, the Chamber
discussed the problematic aspects of the law under the freedom of expression provisions
in Article 29 of the Constitution and Article 10 of the ECHR. The opinion in the decision
of E.M. Shusterman, No. 16-GOZ- 1 (Verkh. Sud RF Feb. 10, 2003), partially reversing,
http://www.medialaw.ru/article0/7/11.htm. (To this author's knowledge, the opinion
was not published in any official publication.)
38. E.B. Abrosimova, Pravovoi status Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Le-
gal Status of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation], in SUDEBNAIA VLAST', supra
note 24, 359-61.
39. Among other reasons, this is significant because of the absence of a tradition of
recognizing binding judicial precedent in the ordinary courts. See Peter B. Maggs, Judi-
cial Precedent Emerges at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 9 J.E. EUR. L.
479 (2002) (identifying a developing acceptance at the SC level of bindingness of certain
SC decisions, particularly in the invalidation of administrative regulations). See also
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 18-19; Sergei Potapenko, Pravovaia pozitsiia verk-
hovnogo suda RF po diffamatsionnym sporam [Legal positions of the Russian Federation
Supreme Court concerning defamation disputes], SUD'IA [JUDGE], Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.supcourt.ru/news detale.php?id 2601 [hereinafter Potapenko 2005].
40. Abrosimova, supra note 38. See also BURNHAM ETAL., supra note 14, at 20-22.
41. .L. Petrukhin, Vvedenie [Introduction], in SUDEBNAIA VLAST', supra note 24, at
I I ("[M]any jurists consider them authoritative and refer to them as sources of law.").
See also Abrosimova, supra note 38, at 360-61 (stating that Explanations operate as a
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The promulgation of these interpretations bears certain hallmarks of
legislative process. Members of the Plenum review and discuss prelimi-
nary drafts, and often outside parties, both from other governmental
agencies and representatives of public organizations, are invited to com-
ment on drafts and to speak at the Plenum.
42
2. Adjudication and Hierarchy in the Ordinary Courts
Supervision of the adjudicatory acts of the ordinary courts lies exclu-
sively within the ordinary court system. Review by higher level regional
courts, as well as the Supreme Court, can take place in one of two ways
(or both, as often is the case): appellate review and discretionary supervi-
sory review.43 The SC's adjudicative functions lie almost entirely in the
appellate and supervisory review of its civil and criminal chambers, and
the power of supervisory review that the Presidium exercises over
Chamber decisions.44 The effectiveness of Explanations is anchored by
the systems of hierarchical administration and discrete case review in the
ordinary courts.
III. THE SOURCES OF LAW QUESTION IN DEFAMATION LAW
In seeking to protect individual reputation, defamation law by its na-
ture implicates the activity that produces the perceived harm-the dis-
semination of communication. Thus, the question is raised as to the func-
tion of normative guarantees protecting freedom of expression: do they
represent only expressive interests for lawmakers to consider in fashion-
ing the binding, generally applicable rules of a defamation normative
system, or are they among the sources of law that courts must interpret
and apply in adjudicating discrete defamation disputes? This is the
sources-of-law question that many domestic legal systems have con-
fronted over the past half-century: whether striking the balance between
the countervailing interests in defamation is the exclusive authority of
lawmakers, or is an exercise susceptible to the intervention of other
sources of law in the form of freedom-of-expression guarantees found in
constitutional or international norms ("external norms"). The former ap-
source of law); Danilenko, Implementation of International Law, supra note 6, at 58;
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 20-22.
42. See BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 20-21, 76-77. See also infra notes 123-36
and accompanying text (describing the December 23, 2004 Plenum's consideration of the
draft that became the 2005 Explanation).
43. For description, see BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 62-63; Krug, Departure,
supra note 14, at 733-35.




proach, under which the defamation normative base is insulated from
external norm intervention, [ will call the "autonomy principle;" the lat-
ter I will call the "plurality principle."
When a given legal system's normative order includes freedom-of-
expression guarantees in either a constitution or an applicable interna-
tional agreement, 45 or both, its identification as one adhering to either the
autonomy or plurality approach will depend on two criteria: 46 (1) "acces-
sibility"-whether external norms generally are directly applicable in the
legal system and may be invoked by individuals; 47 and (2) "applicabil-
ity"-whether the judiciary has recognized the operation of reputational
protections as an "interference" with the exercise of rights guaranteed
under such external norms.40 If external norms meet both criteria and
45. These considerations are outside the question of whether freedom of expression
generally is a norm of customary international law.
46. These matters concern in part the domestic status of international law norms,
including customary (general) international law, in domestic systems that are viewed
either as monist or dualist. In the latter, international norms lack legal effect within the
domestic legal order in the absence of some affirmative act such as a constitutional provi-
sion or legislative act. Thus, the sources-of-law question in defamation law exists regard-
less of whether the legal system is monist or dualist. In the sources of law question, the
issue is not the legal system's general stance toward incorporation of international norms;
instead, it is whether the judiciary in concrete cases will recognize the operation of a
private defamation law system as an interference with the exercise of rights guaranteed
under an incorporated international norm.
The USSR adhered to a strictly dualist approach to these questions, while Article
15(4) of the 1993 Russian Constitution, see infra note 98 and accompanying text, has
moved Russia away from this stance. See Danilenko, Implementation of International
Law, supra note 6, at 52. The Russian Federation still retains certain hallmarks of dual-
ism, however, as illustrated by Article 5(3) of the Russian Law on Treaties [Rossiiskaia
Federatsiia Federal'nyi Zakon "0 mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii"
Federal Law No. 101-FZ, Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Rus-
sian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1995, No. 29, Item 2757, which states that in
certain circumstances (not relevant to the defamation law questions examined in this
article) the incorporation of treaty norms requires enactment of implementing domestic
legislation. See WILLIAM E. BUTLER, THE LAW OF TREATIES IN RUSSIA AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 36-38 (2002); BURNHAM ET AL., supra note
14, at 35.
47. These correspond to the principles of direct applicability and direct effect.
48. The terms "accessibility" and "applicability," as used here, are my own. "Interfer-
ence," a term taken from ECHR Article 10(1), is not synonymous with "violation" of
protected rights. Instead, a finding of interference is a pre-condition for determination of
whether the act constituted a violation. Recognition of an interference is only the first
(but necessary) step toward resolution of the question of a violation. In defamation law,
the core interference question is whether subsequent punishment for a defamatory com-
munication implicates the exercise of freedom of expression or whether interferences are
limited solely to prior restraints on dissemination.
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therefore are what I will call "active," then the legal system follows the
plurality principle. On the other hand, if external norms are generally
accessible but not applicable in the defamation context, they are what I
will call "passive." In such circumstances, the legal system adheres to the
autonomy principle.
For example, it was the recognition of external norms in the 1960s that
led to the "constitutionalization" of defamation law in Germany4 9 and the
United States.5 ° In the 1980s, the ECtHR introduced a new dimension
into this process: the applicability of an international norm, Article 10 of
the ECHR, to domestic systems of reputational protection. 51 In the
ECtHR's seminal 1986 Lingens v. Austria decision,52 the applicant was a
journalist who had been found guilty in a criminal prosecution for a de-
famatory communication. The ECtHR applied to the defamation context
its standard approach to applications based on Article 10, treating the
49. The term "constitutionalization" is borrowed from BASIL S. MARKESINIS &
HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 28-32 (4th
ed. 2002) (describing the intervention of constitutional ideas into the sphere of private
law in Germany, beginning particularly with the German Federal Constitutional Court's
1958 Luth decision). See also Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German
Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REv. 247 (1989); KOMMERS, supra note 28, at 361-71;
Mattias Kumm, Who's Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Princi-
ples and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L. J. 341 (2006), available
at http://www.germanlawjoumal.comarticle.php?id=723.
50. See the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), in which the Court for the first time recognized the First Amend-
ment as applicable to common law defamation. Cf the Court's decision in Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), in which recognized First Amendment interferences
were limited strictly to prior restraints. A forerunner of New York Times v. Sullivan was
the Court's decision in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), in which
the Court recognized a subsequent punishment scheme as an interference with the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights (stating that in "operation and effect" the scheme oper-
ated like a prior restraint). Near, 283 U.S. at 708-13.
51. Article 10 is set forth infra text accompanying note 96. Under Article 10, as inter-
preted by the ECtHR, the sources-of-law question centers on application of Article 10(1).
If that provision is deemed applicable, then it is possible that application of one or more
of the legitimate restrictions in Article 10(2), along with the "necessary in a democratic
society" test, will operate to uphold the appropriateness of the state's interference.
ECHR, supra note 3, art. 10.
There is a sizeable literature on the ECtHR's Article 10 jurisprudence. For cita-
tions, see the recent study by Dan Kozlowski, "For the Protection of the Reputation or
Rights of Others ": The European Court of Human Rights 'Interpretation of the Defama-
tion Exception in Article 10(2), II COMM. L. & POL'Y 133 (2006).
52. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1986). In addition to its ac-
ceptance of subsequent punishment as an Article 10(l) interference, Lingens was the
ECtHR's first decision to interpret the "for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others" restriction in Article 10(2). See Kozlowski, supra note 51, at 141.
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"interference by a public authority" as the threshold determination) 3 If
an interference is found, the ECtHR then will examine the interference
under the requirements of Article 10(2) to decide if it is a violation of the
ECHR, an exercise that will entail determinations of whether the inter-
ference was "prescribed by law," had a legitimate aim under Article
10(2), and was "necessary in a democratic society" for the advancement
of that aim. 54 In Lingens, the ECtHR first determined that Austria's ap-
plication of post-publication sanctions was an "interference" under Arti-
cle 1 0(1) that was not justified under the standards of Article 10(2). 5
The sources-of-law question before the Russian courts since the early
1990s presented a cluster of these considerations. In particular, following
Russia's accession to the ECHR in 1998, the issues centered on the
choice between the autonomy and plurality principles and the legal effect
of ECtHR interpretations of ECHR Article 10.56
IV. THE SOURCES OF RUSSIAN CIVIL DEFAMATION LAW: FROM
LEGISLATIVE TO PLURALISM
A. The Legislative Base
Building on elements from Soviet law and adding the powerful remedy
of monetary compensation for non-economic harms (moral damages),
Russian lawmakers in the first half of the 1990s constructed a statutory
private law structure for protection of individual reputation and other
53. This question usually will first be examined in the ECtHR's admissibility deter-
mination. One of the substantive grounds for the Court's denial of admissibility is a de-
termination that an application is "manifestly ill-founded." ECHR, supra note 3, art. 35,
3.
54. See Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 35.
55. That determination in fact was made in the December 11, 1981 admissibility deci-
sion of the European Commission (the ECtHR's former screening institution). Lingens v.
Austria, 4 EHRR 373 (1982). At the Court, Austria did not dispute the existence of an
interference. Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 35.
Because Lingens involved a criminal prosecution and conviction, a question could
be raised about whether a private plaintiff's civil law action for defamation also consti-
tutes an act of "public authority." This is the drittwirkung (third-party effect) issue ad-
dressed in MARKENSIS & UNBERATH, supra note 49 (discussing the Luth decision) and
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and which both the German Federal
Constitutional Court and the U.S. Supreme Court resolved by concluding that the acts of
law-creation and adjudication by state organs represent "public" or "state" action suffi-
cient to implicate the constitutional protections. In subsequent decisions involving civil
law defamation, the ECtHR has indicated that it takes the same approach. See, e.g., Tol-
stoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, 316 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 (1995).
56. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V & V.I.A.
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personality rights57 that remains largely unchanged in 2006. This legisla-
tive base identifies the protected interests, establishes the circumstances
under which those interests might legally be harmed, identifies defenses,
and prescribes remedies. It contains what the SC until 2005 viewed as
the exclusive, self-contained, comprehensive system of rules for resolu-
tion of personality rights disputes.58 Indeed, until certain lower court de-
cisions in 2002, 59 the proponents of the Civil Code system successfully
withstood all efforts to introduce the plurality principle into civil defama-
tion law.
60
1. The Civil Code
The legislative base is set forth in the 1995 Civil Code of the Russian
Federation, 61 Articles 150-152,62 supplemented by Articles 1099_1 101 .63
57. Krug (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 848-49. An action for civil defamation first was
recognized in 1964. The remedies were limited to retraction and right reply until the addi-
tion of monetary compensation in the early 1990s.
58. See, e.g., Viktor Knyshev, J., Voprosy zashchity chesti i dostoinstva v praktike
Verhkovnogo Suda RF [Questions of Protection of Honor and Dignity in the Practice of
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation], ZAKONODATEL'STVO I PRAKTIKA SREDSTV
MASSOVOI INFORMATSII [LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE MASS INFORMATION MEDIA], Dec.
1997, available at http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/zip/40/questions.html.
59. See discussion infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
60. See discussion infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. See also Krug (pt. 1),
supra note 23, at 873-76; Krug (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 299-301.
61. The Civil Code consists of three "Parts." Part I (Articles 1-453) was signed by
President Yeltsin on November 30, 1994, and entered into force on January 1, 1995.
Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF (Chast' pervaia) [GK] [Civil Code (Part One)] No. 51-FZ. Part
II (Articles 454-1109) was signed by President Yeltsin on January 26, 1996, and entered
into force on March 1, 1996. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF (Chast' vtoraia) [Civil Code of the
Russian Federation (Part Two)] No. 14-FZ. Part Ill (Articles 1110-1224) was signed by
President Putin on November 26, 2001, and entered into force on March 1, 2002.
Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF (Chast' tret'ia) [Civil Code (Part Three)] No. 146-FZ. For a
detailed discussion of these steps, see GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS RossIISKO1 FEDERATSI
[CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION] 10-11 (Peter M. Maggs & Alexei N. Zhitsov
eds. & trans., 2003). All English translations of the Civil Code provisions discussed in
this article are taken from this source. In this article, I will refer to the entire Civil Code
as the 1995 Civil Code (as amended).
Prior to 1995, civil defamation provisions were found in two primary sources-
the 1964 RSFSR Civil Code (as amended) and Osnovy [Foundations] of the USSR (the
most recent of which were enacted in 1991: 1991 Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of
the USSR, No. 2211-1, Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo
Soveta SSR (Bulletin of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and Supreme
Council of the USSR, [Ved. SSSR] 1991, No. 26, Item 733)-supplemented beginning in
1990 with provisions in mass media legislation (the 1990 USSR Law on the Press, sup-
planted in 1991 by the Mass Media Law).
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Article 150 (Nonmaterial Values) identifies a number of protected legal
interests, including honor and good name, business reputation, dignity of
personality, and inviolability of private life.64
a. Civil Defamation-Protection of Reputation Against False
Defamatory Communications
Of the various legal interests identified in Article 150, only reputation
receives detailed codification in the Civil Code. 65 Article 152 (Protection
of Honor, Dignity, and Business Reputation) is devoted solely to protec-
tion of reputational interests: individual honor and business reputation.66
Under Article 152(1), as construed by the Supreme Court, a successful
civil defamation claim has three elements: (1) dissemination of a com-
munication (svedenie67) concerning the plaintiff; (2) that is defamatory
(porochashchie); and (3) is false. 68 Falsity is presumed, subject to the
defendant's proof that the communication was true.69 Liability is strict,
not fault-based.70
Article 152 identifies the remedies (all post-publication) available to
victims of false defamatory communications. These include retraction,
71
a right of reply if the defendant is a mass media outlet,72 and monetary
62. Articles 150-52 comprise Chapter Eight of the Civil Code ("Nonmaterial Values
and Their Protection").
63. Articles 1099-1101 comprise Section Four ("Compensation for Moral Harm") of
Chapter 59 ("Obligations as a Result of the Causing of Harm") of the Civil Code.
64. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 150(1).
65. Id. art. 152.
66. Of these interests, the former is expressly recognized as a fundamental right in the
Constitution (Article 23). The latter is not mentioned in the constitutional text. Id. art. 23.
67. The Russian text of Article 152(1) uses the word svedeniia, which is the plural
form of svedenie. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 152.
68. Id. art. 152(1); 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 7. See also Dmitrii Golovanov
& Sergei Potapenko, Commentary, Primenenie rossiiskimi sudami polozhenii Konventsii
o zashchite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod i praktiki Evropeiskogo suda po pravam
cheloveka: teoreticheskie i prakticheskie aspekty [Application by the Russian courts of
European Human Rights Convention provisions: theoretical and practical aspects],
ZAKONODATEL'STVO I PRAKTIKA MASS-MEDIA [LAW AND PRACTICE IN MASS MEDIA], Mar.
2005, available at http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/zip/127/4.htm [hereinafter
Golovanov & Potapenko 2005]. See also Potapenko 2005, supra note 39, at 6.
69. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 152(1).
70. Krug (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 856-57. Article 1100 of the Civil Code also states
that the imposition of moral damages in defamation cases shall not be based on fault of
the defendant. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 1100. See also infra note
77 and accompanying text.
71. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 152(1).
72. Id. art. 152(3).
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compensation for economic and non-economic harm.73 The non-
monetary remedies have been retained from Soviet legislation enacted in
1964,74 while monetary compensation was introduced into the legislative
base in the early 1990s in a move that increased significantly the number
of civil defamation lawsuits.75
Articles 151 and 1100-1101 address the remedy of compensation for
non-economic harm (moral damages). "Moral harm" is defined as
"physical or mental suffering" experienced as a result of violation of one
of the Article 150 legal interests.76 Moral damages are available for harm
to honor, dignity, and business reputation "regardless of the fault of the
one who caused the harm., 77 The court determines the amount of moral
damages, basing its decision on factors such as the degree of the victim's
physical and mental suffering and the guilty party's degree of fault.78 In
addition, the Civil Code requires that the court consider "the require-
ments of reasonableness and justice" in determining the amount of moral
damages compensation.79
b. Related Personality Rights Claims: Civil Insult and Invasion of
Privacy
Often intermingled with adjudication of civil defamation claims is ju-
dicial consideration of claims based on insult and/or violation of privacy.
The courts recognize these as claims separate from civil defamation.
80
The Civil Code does not identify the claims' elements. 81 Instead, the
courts have grafted them from the Criminal Code of the Russian Federa-
tion.82
The claim of "insult" (oskorblenie) is viewed as civil protection of the
interest of individual dignity. Because it is not expressly addressed in the
73. Id art. 152(5). Articles 15, 1064, and 1082 of the Civil Code are applicable to
harms to business reputation that are eligible for compensation as economic (not moral
harm) losses (ubytki). See BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 370-74.
74. See Krug (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 867-73.
75. See discussion supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Krug, Harm to
Business Reputation, supra note 26. For a broader discussion about the remedy of com-
pensation for "moral harm" generally in Russian law, see BURNHAM ET AL., supra note
14, at 372-73.
76. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 151 ("Compensation for Moral
Harm").
77. Id. art. 1100 ("Bases for Compensation for Moral Harm").
78. Id. arts. 151, 1101(2) ("Method and Amount of Compensation for Moral Harm").
79. Id. art. 1101(2).
80. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 571-72.
81. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] arts. 150-52.
82. BURNHAM ETAL., supra note 14, at 571-72.
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Civil Code, the courts use the definition of "insult" found in Article 130
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which states in relevant
part that insult is "the demeaning of the honor and dignity of another per-
son, expressed in an indecent form. '83 Thus, it should be noted that truth
is not a defense to this claim.
The elements of invasion of privacy (narushenie neprikosnovennosti
chastnoi zhizni) are taken from Article 137 of the Criminal Code. In rele-
vant part, Article 137 defines this violation as:
the illegal gathering or dissemination of information about the personal
life of a person without that person's permission which information
constitutes a personal or family confidence, or the dissemination of
such information ... by means of the mass media, if such actions are
undertaken for reasons of financial gain or personal benefit and cause
harm to the rights and legal interests of citizens.
84
2. The Law on Mass Information Media
The 1992 Law on Mass Information Media (Mass Media Law) 85 is an-
other component of the legislative base. It provides certain exceptions
from liability for journalists and media entities in Article 57.86 It also sets
forth rules for non-monetary remedies that basically amplify the refuta-
tion remedy in Article 152 of the Civil Code. Noteworthy here is the pro-
vision, in Article 46, that recognizes a right of reply for someone identi-
83. Ugolovnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Criminal Code of the Russian Federa-
tion], Federal Law 63-FZ, Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1996, No. 25, Item 2954 (effective Jan. 1,
1997, as amended through Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://www.systema.ru/
development/inc/bdoc.asp?ld 58568 (English translation from 39 STATUTES AND
DECISIONS, No. 4 (July-August 2003), 102). See BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 571.
84. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 137, translated in BURNHAM ET
AL., supra note 14, at 571.
85. Zakon o sredstvakh massovoi informatsii [Law on Mass Information Media],
Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnogo Sovela
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ved. RFI [Bulletin of the Congress of People's Deputies of the
Russian Federation and Supreme Council of the Russian Federation] 1992, No. 7, Item
300 [hereinafter Mass Media Law] [last amended July 21, 2005 (No. 93-FZ)], available
at http:llwww.medialaw.ru/laws/russian laws/txtU2.htm (English language version (up to
and including amendments of December 8, 2003) available at http://www.medialaw.rul
e pages/laws/russian/massmedia eng/massmedia eng.html).
86. Article 57 sets forth six circumstances in which journalists and media entities will
be immune from liability for dissemination of defamatory information. For example,
these circumstances include the dissemination of information from reports whose public
distribution was required by law, the dissemination of information received from news
agencies, and the literal reproduction of statements made by deputies during sessions of
the federal legislature and statements of office holders of state institutions. Id. art. 57.
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identified in a factually correct defamatory statement. It also reiterates
the Civil Code's moral damages remedy in cases of violations of person-
ality rights by journalists and media entities.87
3. Supreme Court Interpretations: The 1992 and 2005 Explanations
Of great importance for the practice of the ordinary courts are the SC's
Explanations that interpret the legislative base. From its promulgation to
its replacement in February 2005, the 1992 Explanation served as a lead-
ing source for the ordinary courts in their adjudication of defamation dis-
putes.88 The Explanations among other things seek to eliminate judicial
uncertainty as to the meaning of indeterminate or ambiguous legislative
texts. For example, both the 1992 and 2005 Explanations defined the
term "defamatory meaning" as found, but not defined, in Article 152 of
the Civil Code.89
In sum, the legislative base reflects the legislature's policy determina-
tions as to the proper balance between reputational and free expression
interests.9" The defamation law system established in the early 1990s
reflected the aspirations and success of personality rights advocates, who
viewed it as a long-awaited vehicle of effective recourse for individuals
targeted in public fora for ridicule and humiliation, particularly by more
powerful media entities.91 This structure was consciously weighted heav-
ily in favor of plaintiffs and quickly became a popular form of legal ac-
tion.92 In addition to providing strict liability, placing the burden on de-
87. Id. art. 46.
88. 1992 Explanation, supra note 34, art. 62.
89. Id. § 2; 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 7. The latter slightly revised the 1992
Explanation's definition. Regarding the 1992 Explanation's definition, see Krug (pt. 1),
supra note 23, at 854.
90. Potapenko 2005, supra note 39, at 4.
91. See Krug (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 863-76.
92. Id. at 848-51. Some recent statistics are provided in a 2005 report by the Repre-
sentative on Freedom of the Media for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE). The report states:
According to data from the governmental statistical reporting for 2002, 7,464
court judgements were issued on civil cases connected with the protection of
honour, dignity and business reputation, for 2003, 6,498 and for the first six
months of 2004, 3,320 such judgements were issued.
ORG. FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, LIBEL AND INSULT LAWS: A MATRIX
ON WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE 130 (2005), available at
http://www.osce.org/fom/documents.html.
A recent detailed study of defamation actions in one province-Arkhangel'sk-is
found in N.A. Pushkarev, J., Obobshchenie po rezul'tatam izucheniia sudebnoi praktiki
po delam a zashchite chesti i dostoinstva grazhdan, a takzhe delovoi reputatsii grazhdan i
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fendants to prove the truth of impugned communications, and giving
broad judicial discretion as to the amount of damages, it also provided a
broad construction of "communication" and "defamatory meaning" to
include not only assertions of fact but also statements of opinion.
B. External Norms, Particularly the ECHR
Because of the new directions that began in 2002 and culminated in the
SC's 2005 Explanation, it now is accepted that civil defamation law is
grounded in the plurality principle, with multiple active sources of law:
the legislative base, Article 29 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian
Federation, and Article 10 of the ECHR. The steps in this process in-
volved recognition of the applicability of the ECHR as an active external
source of law in both scattered lower court decisions and SC Explana-
tions generally applicable to the entire ordinary court system.
Even before 2002, the pre-conditions for applicability of external
norms in civil defamation existed. Article 29 of the 1993 Russian Consti-
93tution includes express guarantees for freedom of speech and the press.
In addition, throughout the period in question, Russia was a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
iuridicheskikh lits za period 2002-2004 gody (izvlechenie) [General conclusions on the
results of a study for the period 2002-2004 ofjudicial practice in cases concerning pro-
tection of honor and dignity of citizens and business reputation of citizens and legal per-
sons (excerpts)], Aug. 23, 2004 [hereinafter Arkhangel'sk Report], http://www.arhcourt.
ru/?Documents/Civ/Gen/200417170003. The report stated that courts in the province
heard 336 civil defamation cases in the thirty-month period starting on January 1, 2002.
93. Article 29 states in full:
I. Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech.
2. Propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred or
enmity shall not be allowed.
The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or language superiority
shall be prohibited.
3. No one may be forced to express his or her opinions and convictions or to
renounce them.
4. Everyone shall have the right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce and
disseminate information in any lawful way. The list of data that constitute state
secrets shall be established by federal statute.
5. Freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohib-
ited.
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 29, translated in
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 643.
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includes free expression guarantees in its Article 19. 94 Finally, and most
central to this Article, in 1998 Russia acceded to the ECHR. 9s Article 10
(Freedom of Expression) of the ECHR states in full:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licens-
ing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restric-
tions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a de-
mocratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-
dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judici-
96
ary.
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR] (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1966;
entered into force on March 23, 1976). The USSR ratified the ICCPR on March 23, 1976,
and Russia is the successor state to the USSR. ICCPR Article 19 states in full:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall in-
clude freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are neces-
sary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.
95. Federal'nyi zakon "0 ratikatsii Konventsii o zashchite pray cheloveka i osnov-
nykh svobod i Protokolov k nei [Federal Law "On the ratification of the Convention on
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols "'] Federal
Law No. 54-FZ, Sobranie Zakonadatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Fed-
eration Collection of Legislation] 1998, No. 14, Item 1514 [hereinafter ECHR Accession
Act].
96. ECHR, supra note 3, art. 10.
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Articles 29, 19, and 10 also were accessible.97 Under Articles 15(1) and
15(4) of the Constitution, both constitutional and international treaty
norms are directly applicable in the legal system and in fact are superior
to conflicting legislation. 98 Article 18 provides that human rights protec-
tions operate with direct effect-that is, individuals have standing to in-
voke them in the courts.99 In addition, actors in the legal system must
recognize and guarantee the human rights and freedoms enumerated in
97. For discussion of accessibility and applicability, see supra notes 47-48.
98. Article 15(1) states in full:
The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have supreme legal force and
direct effect, and shall be applicable throughout the entire territory of the Rus-
sian Federation. Laws and any other legal acts adopted within the Russian Fed-
eration may not contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
Article 15(4) states in full:
Generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the interna-
tional treaties of the Russian Federation shall constitute an integral part of its
legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes
rules other than those provided for by the law, the rules of the international
treaty shall apply.
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts. 15(l), 15(4) translated
in BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 640. For a detailed discussion of Article 15(4), see
Danilenko, New Russian Constitution, supra note 6, at 464-66, and Danilenko, Imple-
mentation of International Law, supra note 6, at 57-58, 68. According to one commenta-
tor, Justice Vereshchetin of the ICJ, Article 15(4) reflected the adoption of a "radically
new principle" in Russian law. In contrast, he noted: "The former Constitutions of the
Soviet Union and of Russia never contained general principles on the relationship be-
tween international law and internal law." Vladlen S. Vereschchetin, New Constitutions
and the Old Problem of the Relationship Between International Law and National Law, 7
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1996), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol7/Nol/art2.pdf
The Civil Code, supra note 61, itself allows for this in regard to the relationship
between its provisions and international treaty norms. The second paragraph of Article
7(2) states in full: "If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules
other than those that are provided by civil legislation, the rules of the international treaty
are applied." However, to this author's knowledge, Article 7(2) never has been invoked,
at least successfully, by a defendant in a defamation case.
99. Article 18 states in full:
The rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen shall have direct effect.
They shall determine the meaning, content and application of the laws, the ac-
tivities of the legislative and executive branches and local self-government and
shall be enforced by the judiciary.
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 18, translated in
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 641.
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the Constitution in conformity with "generally recognized principles and
norms of international law and in accordance with this Constitution."' 00
In an affirmation of the availability of external norms and their acces-
sibility, the SC in 1995 directed the ordinary courts to use external norms
as active sources of law when applicable, and to refrain from applying
legislative acts that conflict with those norms. 10 In other words, the SC
directed the courts to act as constitutional control bodies within the limits
of their competency.
In defamation law, however, the external norms were passive: the or-
dinary courts did not recognize their applicability to disputes in which
the Civil Code's protections of individual reputation and other personal-
ity rights were invoked. Thus, in the 1990s, the SC ignored or rejected
efforts to make Article 29 active. 0 2 Challenges to the private law struc-
ture, at least to some of its specific elements, began in the mid-1990s.
0 3
These challenges were of two types, often expressed concurrently: a plu-
rality principle argument, grounded in the free expression guarantees in
Article 29 of the Constitution and directed toward invalidation of the
Civil Code's defamation scheme, 10 4 and the use of narrow statutory con-
100. Id. art. 17(l), translated in BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 640-41.
101. Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation] 1996, No. 1, p. 3, available at http:lwww.supcourt.rul
vscourtdetale.php?id=3863 (Postanovlenie No. 8 Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Ros-
siiskoi Federatsii ot 31 oktiabria 1995 g. "0 nekotorykh voprosakh primeneniia sudami
Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii pri osushchestvlenii pravosudiia" [Decree No. 8 of the
Plenum of the Russian Federation Supreme Court dated October 31, 1995 "Concerning
Several Questions on the Courts' Application of the Russian Federation Constitution in
the Administration of Justice"]) [hereinafter 1995 Explanation]. See also Krug, Depar-
ture, supra note 14, at 754-56.
102. Krug (pt.2), supra note 23, at 333-34; Krug, Departure, supra note 14, at 778;
Peter Krug, Press Freedom in Russia: Does the Constitution Matter?, in RUSSIA AND ITS
CONSTITUTION: PROMISE AND POLITICAL REALITY, (Gordon B. Smith & Robert Sharlet
eds., forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Krug, Press Freedom in Russia].
103. Krug (pt.2), supra note 23, at 303-07.
104. A particularly illustrative expression of frustration with the autonomy principle
came in a commentator's 1994 observation that a Moscow appellate court had been liter-
ally correct in its decision in favor of a defamation plaintiff, but at the same time had
lacked "the least particle of civil responsibility." See Krug (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 300
(lawyer and human rights activist Kronid Lyubarsky, commenting on the outcome in
Zhirinovskii v. Gaidar, in which defendants former Prime Minister Egor Gaidar and the
newspaper lzvestiia were found guilty of defamation for publication of statements that
the plaintiff, State Duma Deputy Vladimir Zhirinovskii, was "a fascist populist" and "the
most popular fascist in Russia"-statements that the defendants unsuccessfully had ar-
gued were expressions of opinion not susceptible to liability).
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structions of the Civil Code to make it consistent with Article 29.105 A
particular target of both was the practice of the Russian courts in treating
similarly all communications-assertions of fact and statements of opin-
ion-thereby rejecting recognition of a distinction, with different legal
effects, between them.1
0 6
However, the SC did not deviate from the autonomy principle in either
its interpretive or adjudicative capacities. The 1992 Explanation,
amended in 1993 and 1995 and in effect until adoption of the 2005 Ex-
planation, adhered strictly to legislative and private law autonomy. The
Explanation did not make any references to free expression interests or
cite to any external norms in its interpretive analysis of the applicable
legislation.H7 As to adjudication, in its only published adjudication of a
concrete defamation case, the SC, in 1997, expressly rejected adoption of
the plurality concept. 1°8
105. See, e.g., A. Erdelevskii, Utzverzhdenie o fakte I vyrazhenie mneniia-poniatiia
raznogo roda (Assertions offact and expression of an opinion-two different concepts),
ROSSIISKAIA IUSTITSIiA, June 1997, at 17; S. Potapenko, Faktv I mneniia v delakh o
zaschite chesti (Facts and opinions in the protection of reputation disputes), ROSSIISKAIA
IUSTITSIIA, July 2001, at 28, 29 [hereinafter Potapenko, Facts and Opinions].
106. See, e.g., A. Erdelevskii, supra note 105, at 47; S. Potapenko, Facts and Opin-
ions, supra note 105, at 28; S.V. Potapenko, Lichnoe mnenie kak privilegiia ot iska o
diffimatsii v SM! [Personal opinion as a privilege against complaints about defamation in
the mass media], ZH.R.P., May 2002, at 72.
The fact/opinion question has been a significant component in the defamation
jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court. See SABINE MICHALOWSKI &
LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
200-06 (1999). See also MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 49, at 380.
107. 1992 Explanation, supra note 34. The 1995 amendments, which came after the
1993 Constitution and its provision for direct applicability and direct effect of constitu-
tional and international norms, still adhered to the prior autonomy principles. In keeping
the 1992 Explanation intact, the SC declined to accept invitations to adopt the plurality
principle from either the CC or a conference of ordinary court judges and journalists.
Regarding the former, issued in the CC's 1995 Kozyrev determination, supra note 29, see
Potapenko 2005, supra note 39, at 4, and Krug (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 303-07. The
latter appeal was made in 1999 by a conference of judges and journalists in Krasnodar
Krai. See Iurii Luchinskii, Konferentsiia sudei i zhurnalistov [Conference ofjudges and
journalists], ZAKONODATEL'STVO I PRAKTIKA SREDSTV MASSOVOI INFORMATS]I [LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE MASS INFORMATION MEDIA], May 1999, http://www.medialaw.ru/
publications/zip/regional/krasnodar/krasnodarl.html#4. To some extent, it may be said
that the SC's 2005 Explanation is in effect a response to the questions raised in those
appeals.
108. In the SC's 1997 decision, the Vologda Provincial Court Civil Chamber and Pre-
sidium had applied the free expression protections of Article 29 of the Constitution to
dismiss a defamation lawsuit. But see the SC's application of plurality in a decision in-
volving a provincial insult law: the 2003 Shusterman decision, supra note 37. On super-
visory review, the Supreme Court's Civil Chamber reversed these decisions on the
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1. Foundations for New Directions: The 2002 Karelia Decision and
Other Lower Court Practice
Despite the apparent solidarity of the private law structure, a 2002 dis-
trict court decision in the Republic of Karelia signaled the beginning of
the movement toward plurality) 0 9 The court dismissed a civil defamation
complaint brought by two republican legislative deputies against two
local newspapers and two individuals." 0 Citing what it called the "prece-
dential law" of the ECtHR as expressed in Lingens v. Austria,' 1 the court
concluded that the communications in question, critical of the plaintiffs,
were value judgments and therefore lacked a defamatory meaning.' 
2
This decision's implicit adoption of the plurality principle was note-
worthy in itself. However, the succession of the steps that the court took
to reach its judgment was also significant.' 13 These steps were:
1. The court's recognition of the availability and accessibility of the
ECHR. However, in itself, a reading of the Article 10 text would not
necessarily have resulted in dismissal of the suit, since the text does not
address the specific questions presented. Indeed, if anything, a reason-
able reading of the text could yield a conclusion that the inclusion of
"protection of reputation" among the Article 10(2) exceptions would
grounds that false defamatory statements fall outside the zone of Article 29 protection.
See Krug, Departure, supra note 14, at 778.
109. Karelia decision, Mar. 12, 2002, available at http://www.medialaw.ru/articlelO/
7/2/08.htm. The Republic of Karelia is one of the eighty-nine Subjects of the Russian
Federation. The Karelia decision is among a collection of lower court judgments in defa-
mation cases posted at the website of the Moscow Media Law and Policy Institute,
http://www.medialaw.ru/articlelO/7/index.htm. To this author's knowledge, the decisions
have not otherwise been published. Hereinafter, citations to cases found in this collection
will be to the name of the Province in which they were rendered, and the date of the
judgment.
Although cracks began to appear in the autonomy principle structure in 2002, and
a significant departure occurred in 2005 with the SC's 2005 Explanation, manifestations
of the autonomy principle remain, particularly in the practice of the Arbitrazh courts. A
recent, highly visible illustration of such exclusion of external law is found in the multi-
ple decisions of the Arbitrazh courts in the Alfa Bank v. Kommersant litigation, supra
note 26. The four court decisions in that case do not include recognition of the applicabil-
ity (or potential applicability) of external norms. The defendant Kommersant in Septem-
ber 2005 filed an application at the ECtI-IR, claiming violation of rights guaranteed under
the ECHR, including Article 10. The ECtHR has not made an admissibility decision re-
garding the application at the time of this writing. Id.
110. Karelia decision, supra note 109,
111. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1986).
112. Id.
113. The judgment did not state most of these explicitly, but the logical progression is
evident from its text.
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have excluded the application of the free expression provisions of Article
I0(1).114
2. The court's recognition of the relevance, in some sense, of ECtHR
practice interpreting Article 10. In doing this, the Karelia decision ap-
pears to have been the first in the Russian courts to refer to ECtHR inter-
pretations as a category for authoritative guidance on Article 10.
3. The court's recognition of Article 10's applicability, based on the
ECtHR's recognition of an "interference" in an analogous case (Lingens
v. Austria) involving subsequent punishment for an unlawful communi-
cation.
4. Having adopted the plurality principle, the Karelia court again iden-
tified the ECtHR's position, articulated in Lingens, that the fact/opinion
distinction has legal consequences.
5. Having concluded that the ECtHR's Lingens position was applica-
ble, the Karelia court did not apply Article 10 to declare application of
Article 152 of the Civil Code unconstitutional or to refer the question of
Article 152's constitutionality to the CC.'1 5 Instead, the court engaged in
statutory construction to determine that a statement of opinion cannot
have a "defamatory meaning" under Article 152. In doing so, the court
114, Indeed, the explicit inclusion of "protection of the reputation or rights of others"
among the legitimate aims that might justify a state's imposition of restrictions on the
exercise of expressive rights should serve as support for continued reliance on the legisla-
tive base as the sole authority in adjudication of reputation disputes. Certainly, the Article
10 text does not provide any more protection for expressive interests than does the com-
bination of Articles 29 and 55(3) of the Russian Constitution. Article 29 is set forth supra
note 93. Article 55(3) states in full:
The rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen may be restricted by fed-
eral statute only to the extent necessary to protect the fundamentals of the con-
stitutional system, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other persons,
or to ensure the defense of the country and the security of the state.
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 53(3), translated in
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 648. For analysis of the CC's interpretation and appli-
cation of Article 55(3), see Peter Krug, Assessing Legislative Restrictions on Constitu-
tional Rights: The Russian Constitutional Court and Article 55(3), 56 OKLA. L. REv. 677
(2003).
115. Article 101 of the CC Statute, supra note 28, provides for ordinary court referral
to the CC upon the ordinary court's conclusion that a legislative normative act normally
applicable in a concrete dispute is inconsistent with the Constitution. For a discussion
about the referral mechanism, including the controversy over whether it is mandatory or
discretionary, see BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 98-102, and Krug, Departure, su-
pra note 14, at 746-50.
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arguably went beyond the dictates of the SC's definition of "defamatory
meaning" in its 1992 Explanation.' 
1 6
Central to the Karelia court's approach, and also similar to subsequent
lower court adjudicatory decisions, was recognition of the weight to be
afforded to ECtHR interpretations of the ECHR. Thus began the gradual
movement toward internalization of the ECtHR's practice, which pro-
ceeded hand in hand with growing recognition of the plurality principle
in defamation law.
2. Internalization and the Plurality Principle as Uniform Mandates:
Supreme Court Explanations and the "Take into Account" Directive
a. The October 10, 2003 Explanation
The approaches of the lower courts in the early sporadic decisions were
not uniform: some appear to have been internalizing ECtHR practice and
adopting the plurality principle out of a sense of legal mandate, 1 7 while
others apparently were doing so as a matter of discretion, treating the
ECtHR's interpretation of the binding Article 10 as persuasive authority.
In generally applicable Explanations starting in October 2003, the Su-
preme Court began the process of establishing uniformity of practice in
this area.
The October 10, 2003 Explanation addressed the internalization ques-
tion as a general matter, without reference to Article 10 or defamation
disputes.1 9 Having first established that international agreements, includ-
ing the ECHR, to which Russia is a party, are binding in the Russian le-
gal system, the Explanation informed the lower courts that, in all cases
116. 1992 Explanation, supra note 34. In section 2, paragraph 2, the 1992 Explanation
stated in full:
False communications which are defamatory are those which contain assertions
about the violation by a citizen or organization of applicable legislation or
moral principles (about commission of dishonorable acts, incorrect behavior in
the workplace or in private life, or other statements discrediting productive
economic or social activity, reputation, and so on), diminishing their honor and
dignity.
Id. § 2, para. 2. For further discussion, see Krug (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 854.
117. The use of the term "precedential law" in the Karelia decision suggests that the
court considered itself bound to apply the ECtHR interpretation in question. See Karelia
decision, supra note 109.
118. The 1995 Explanation, supra note 101, did not address judicial interpretations of
treaty norms and of course was promulgated before Russia's 1998 accession to the
ECHR.
119. October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35.
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where the ECHR is applicable, they must "take into account" the
ECtHR's "practice" in order "to avoid violations of the ECHR."'
120
b. The 2005 Explanation
Although the October 10, 2003 Explanation broadly called upon the
courts to take into account the ECtHR's practice, it did not explicitly cite
Article 10 and therefore did not in itself resolve the specific question of
whether, as a generally applicable rule, defamation disputes should be
subject to the plurality principle.12 1 Meanwhile, in 2004, a growing num-
ber of courts continued to apply the plurality principle. 
22
On December 23, 2004, the Supreme Court Plenum, with representa-
tives of government agencies and other courts in attendance and partici-
pating, along with representatives of NGOs and journalists' organiza-
120. Id. §§ 10, paras. 2-3; 11, para. 2. In some places, the Court uses the verb uchity-
vat' (see § 10, para. 2)--in others, the phrase "osuchshestvliat'sia s uchetom" (see § 10,
para. 3). Both may be rendered as "take into account." For detailed discussion as to the
meaning of this "take into account" requirement, see infra Part VI.A.
In another illustration of the growing importance of the ECtHR's practice, the SC
in a December 19, 2003 Explanation directed the lower courts, as part of their require-
ment under the Civil Procedure Code, to set forth a statement of reasons in their judg-
ments, and to make citations to specific ECtHR decisions whenever they were making
use of ECtHR interpretations. Biulleten' Verkovnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 2004, No. 2, p. 3, § 4, available at
http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt detale.php?id= 1419 (Postanovlenie N. 23 Plenuma
Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 dekabria 2003 g. "0 sudebnom reshenii"
[Decree No. 23 of the Plenum of the Russian Federation Supreme Court "Concerning the
Judicial Decision"]) [hereinafter December 19, 2003 Explanation]. A noteworthy aspect
of this judicial gloss on Article 198 of the Civil Code (which does not mention the
ECtHR) is that section 4 included the ECtHR among the three courts for whom it must
provide such citations, the other two being the SC itself and the CC. In other words, this
leaves the implication that the ECtHR is to be viewed as another high court in the Rus-
sian legal system.
121. The plurality principle includes applicability of Article 29 of the Constitution, as
well as ECHR Article 10. However, in the ordinary courts' practice and in the 2005 Ex-
planation, the use and influence of Article 10 far exceed those of Article 29. This un-
doubtedly is attributable to the wide availability and prestigious influence of the ECtHR
interpretive practice. See 2005 Explanation, supra note 2.
122. For example, at least two courts stated this expressly. In an October 14, 2004
decision, the Civil Chamber of the Sverdlovsk Provincial Court articulated recognition of
the plurality of sources in civil defamation law. Sverdlovsk Civil Chamber Decision, No.
33-8056, available at http:/www.femida.e-burg.ru/show doc.php?id=3829. In a Novem-
ber 20, 2003 decision, a Sverdlovsk Province District Court set forth the plurality princi-
ple in detail, citing the applicable sources of law: norms of the ECHR; decisions of the
ECtHR; the Constitution; decisions of the CC; the Civil Code (as interpreted by the SC);
and the Mass Media Law. Sverdlovsk District Court Decision, available at
http://www.medialaw.ru/articlel0/7/2/14.htm.
2006]
BROOK. J INT'L L.
tions, met to consider the latest draft of an Explanation that would re-
place the 1992 Explanation and in doing so address the question of the
active sources in defamation law.123 The timing of the Plenum was note-
worthy in light of increasing signals from Strasbourg that Russia's defa-
mation scheme was undergoing growing scrutiny.124 Two weeks earlier,
the ECtHR had found four applications by defamation defendants against
Russia admissible, 25 raising to seven the number of such applications
123. A number of speakers at the Plenum were judges from the regional higher courts
and representatives from the Procuracy and government agencies, as well as representa-
tives of journalists' professional organizations. The official report on the Plenum is found
in Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Rus-
sian Federation] 2005, No. 4, p. 1, available at http://www.supcourt.ru/
vscourtdetale.php?id=2536 (Plenuma Verkovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 23
dekabria 2004 g. "0 sexebnoi praktike po delam o zashchite chesti I dostoinstva
grazhdan, a takzhe delovoi reputatsii grazhdan I iuridicheskikh lits" [Plenum of the Su-
preme Court of the Russian Federation from 23 December 2004 "Concerning Judicial
Practice in Cases Concerning the Defense of Honor and Dignity and the Business Repu-
tations of Citizens and Businesses"]) [hereinafter Plenum Report]. Reports from the press
include: Mikhail Fedotov, Supreme Court Opens Door to Better Rules, THE Moscow
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at 10, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com
/stories/2005/03/02/006.html (access requires payment, on file with the Brooklyn Journal
of International Law); Andrei Richter, Chest' i dostoinstvo: shag k svobode slova [Honor
and Dignity: A Step Toward Freedom of Speech], VEDOMOSTI [GAzE-rrE], Mar. 5, 2005,
available at http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2005/03/05/88980 (access
requires payment, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter
Richter, VEDOMOSTI]. See also Dmitrii Golovanov, Commentary, Novaia redaktsiia
Postanovleniia Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda po delam o zashchite chestoi, dostoinstva i
delovoi reputatsii: proryvy, udachi i nedorabotki [The New Edition of the Supreme Court
Plenum 's Decree on Cases Involving Protection of Honor, Dignity and Business Reputa-
tions: Break-throughs, Accomplishments and Shortcomings], ZAKONODATEL'STVO I
PRAKTIKA MASS-MEDIA [LAW AND PRACTICE IN MASS-MEDIA), Mar. 2005,
http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/zip/127/3.htm [hereinafter Golovanov 2005]; Po-
tapenko 2005, supra note 39; Tat'iana Smyslova, Commentary, Kommentarii K
Postanovleniiu Plenuma Verhkovnogo Suda RF N. 3 at 24fevralia 2005 g. "0 sudebnoi
praktike po delam o zashchite chesti i dostoinstva grazhdan, a takzhe delovoi reputatsii
grazhdan i iuridicheskikh lits" [Commentary on the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation No. 3from 24 February 2005 "Concerning Court Prac-
tice in Cases Involving the Protection of Honor and Dignity of Citizens and the Business
Reputations of Citizens and Businesses"] (2005), http://www.gdf.ru/law/st-03 5.shtml.
124. Richter, VEDOMOSTI, supra note 123. The existence of a connection between
these concerns and the ECtHR's reiteration of the "take into account" requirement and its
"avoidance of violation" standard is plausible. See discussion infra notes 197-206 and
accompanying text.




found admissible in 2004.26 The SC President, Judge V.M. Lebedev,
supported the proposed Explanation, much of which had been drafted by
Judge S.V. Potapenko, a member of the SC and a long-time advocate of
the fact/opinion distinction and incorporation of Article 10.127 Judge Po-
tapenko served as the rapporteur (dokladchik) at the Plenum. 128 Also
adding to the atmosphere were expressions of concern from lower ordi-
nary courts seeking resolution of defamation law questions. For example,
the detailed August 2004 study by Judge Pushkarev of Arkhangel'sk
Province stated as one of its conclusions:
In each concrete civil case, it is necessary to strive to make certain that
the claim for protection of honor and good name does not run counter
to freedom of speech in a democratic society. This must be the judge's
responsibility in hearing and deciding disputes for protection of honor,
dignity, and business reputation.'
2 9
To accomplish this, the report proposed that the courts continue to ana-
lyze the "unclear and controversial questions" that arise in reputational
disputes.1
30
The result of the Plenum was approval of a new Explanation on ques-
tions of civil defamation law which, after final editing, was promulgated
on February 24, 2005 (the 2005 Explanation). 3 ' The 2005 Explanation
replaced the 1992 Explanation. 132 Its most fundamental departure from
its predecessor was the express adoption of the plurality principle in civil
defamation law.133 In contrast to the 1992 Explanation's absence of ref-
erences to sources of law outside the legislative base, the 2005 Explana-
126. See Filatenko v. Russia, supra note 9; Dyuldin & Kislov v. Russia, supra note 9.
In addition, the application in Grinberg v. Russia, decided on the merits on July 21, 2005,
was found admissible on October 28, 2004. Grinberg v. Russia, App. No. 23472/03, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2005). It is also possible that the SC judges were aware of the draft of the criti-
cal report that PACE subsequently adopted on June 22, 2005. See Honouring of Obliga-
tions, supra note 7.
127. See, e.g., Potapenko, Facts and Opinions, supra note 106.
128. See Plenum Report, supra note 123.
129. Arkhangel'sk Report, supra note 92.
130. Id.
131. See 2005 Explanation, supra note 2.
132. Id. § 19.
133. Some of the speakers at the December 23, 2004 Plenum expressly endorsed this
step. For example, the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court, V.V. Gorshkov, wel-
comed the draft Explanation's incorporation of ECtHR Interpretations, listing specifically
the free expression of statements of opinion, the essential role of the mass media in de-
mocratic society, the lifting of the burden on defendants to prove the truth of value judg-
ments, and the duty of journalists to verify assertions of fact prior to publication. Plenum
Report, supra note 123, at 2.
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tion, in its Preamble, specifically cited the relevancy to defamation law
of the freedom of speech and "mass information" guarantees in Article
29 of the Constitution and Article 10 of the ECHR,134 and stated that
Russia's accession to the ECHR gave rise to new questions in the courts'
defamation practice. 135 In this regard, the SC reminded the courts to take
into account earlier Explanations in which it addressed in general terms
the domestic incorporation of international norms.1 36 As a result, the SC
instructed the courts in deciding defamation disputes to observe a bal-
ance between a citizen's right of reputation and the freedoms of speech
and mass information.' 37 In conjunction with its adoption of plurality, the
Explanation also specifically mandated adherence to the SC's "take into
account" requirement in the defamation law context, directing the courts
to internalize ECtHR interpretations of Article 10 in their adjudication of
defamation disputes.
138
The Explanation is also noteworthy as the first SC pronouncement rec-
ognizing, although in somewhat sporadic fashion, the rights and role of
the mass information media. In addition to the references cited in the
above paragraph, the SC also included a rule regarding attention to con-
cerns of the mass information media in section 15 of the Explanation.
39
In all, these references, as well as the general tenor of the Explanation,
were warmly received by press freedom supporters.1 40 From their point
of view, these were threshold steps of considerable importance, repre-
senting the first significant judicial recognition in Russia of the incidental
impact of generally applicable laws on the exercise of free speech and
press freedoms.141 While evidence of their active implementation must
await future developments, their articulation alone stands in marked con-
trast to highly visible judicial decisions in recent years in which Russian
courts did not voice recognition of such interests or take them into ac-
count. 142
134. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, Preamble, paras. 1-2.
135. Id. Preamble, para. 5.
136. Id. § 1, para. 4 (citing 1995 Explanation, supra note 101, and October 10, 2003
Explanation, supra note 35).
137. Id. § t, para. 3.
138. Id. § 1, para. 5.
139. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
140. Fedotov, supra note 123; Richter, VEDOMOSTI supra note 123; Smyslova, supra
note 123.
141. Fedotov, supra note 123; Richter, VEOOMOSTI supra note 123; Smyslova, supra
note 123.
142. These include the Alfa Bank v. Kommersant litigation, supra note 26, and the
controversies over the broadcast licenses of the companies NTV and TV-6. The latter
disputes included protracted litigation in the Arbitrazh courts, as well as a subsequent
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Having adopted the multiplicity of sources in defamation law, along
with the internalization of the ECtHR's practice interpreting Article 10,
the SC's path was open to the re-shaping of specific aspects of that body
of law-an exercise in which the lower courts had been pointing the
way.
V. THE NEW DIRECTIONS: APPLICATION OF THE PLURALITY PRINCIPLE
AND ECTHR INTERNALIZATION
The 2002 Karelia decision 143 was the forerunner of a number of lower
ordinary court decisions in which the ECHR and the ECtHR interpreta-
tions were employed to fashion new approaches to defamation law.144 A
Constitutional Court decision. Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RE [Vestn. VAS]
[The Highest Arbitration Court of the RF Reporter], available at
http://arbitr.garant.ru/public/default.asp?no= 1676453 (Postanovlenie Prezidiuma
Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF ot 11 ianvaria 2002 g. N. 32/02 [Decree of the Presid-
ium of the Highest Arbitration Court RF from II January 2002 N. 32/03]; Sobranie Za-
konodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legisla-
tion] 2003, No. 30, p. 7619, available at http://mirror2.garant.ru/webclient/
navigation.dsp?topic=867137&realid=12031809&page=l #end. See Krug, Press Freedom
in Russia, supra note 102.
143. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
144. For this article, I have examined eighteen lower court decisions that were chosen
because of the detailed information available and the issues they presented. In most cases,
the full judgments of the courts were examined. This list is not intended to be representa-
tive of lower court practice during the years in question. Among other things, I am not
aware of any systematic compilation of lower court decisions. The cases examined for
this article were located at the following websites: the Moscow Media Law and Policy
Institute (MMLPC), supra note 109; the Central-Chemozem Center for Defense of the
Rights of the Mass Information Media, http://www.mmdc.narod.ru/analytics/
analytic l.html; the Sutiazhnik Obshchestvennoe Ob"edinenie [Sutyajnik Public Asso-
ciation], http://www.sutyajnik.ru/rus/echr/school/dom judg.html; the Sverdlovsk Oblast'
court, http://www.femida.e-burg.ru; the Arkhangel'sk Oblast' court, http://www.arhcourt.
ru/?Documents/Civ/Gen; the Tsentr Extremal'noi Zhurnalistiki [Center for Journalism in
Extreme Situations], http://www.cjes.ru/index-e.php; and the Fond Zashehiti Glasnosti
(Glasnost Defense Foundation), http://www.gdf.ru. Some of these provide reports and
detailed summaries of court judgments, but others (particularly the MMLPC, but also the
Central-Chemozem, Sutiazhnik, and Sverdlovsk oblast court websites) make available
the judgments themselves-a useful resource for viewing "law in action" in Russia's
provincial courts. These are mostly district court decisions, with a few appellate judg-
ments by the regional [Subject] higher courts. Hereinafter, citations to cases found in
these collections will be to the name of the Province in which they were rendered, and the
date of the judgment.
Clearly, this research must be selective, not comprehensive. To my knowledge,
there is not any systematic method of gathering information from all regional courts in
the vast Russian system. Another limitation is that it is not possible in a systematic fash-
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number of the cases presented fact patterns similar to Karelia: public
officials, usually elected, suing local journalists and mass media outlets
for reports that in many cases alleged corruption or mismanagement of
public assets.1
45
A noteworthy element in many of these disputes is the apparent impact
of defense lawyers, often affiliated with NGOs, utilizing the ECHR and
ECtHR to bolster their arguments. Russia's accession to the ECHR
placed a potentially useful tool in the hands of press freedom advocates
as they sought, often successfully, to persuade courts to dismiss com-
plaints in their entirety, dismiss specific claims in complaints while im-
posing liability in regard to others, or to award moral damages far below
the amounts sought by plaintiffs. 46 Some of these cases provide vivid
illustration of the decisive value and effectiveness of NGO advocacy.
47
ion to follow the outcome on further appeals in a number of the cases. In this regard,
however, I have not found any cases that came under supervisory review at the SC.
145. For discussion of a number of these decisions, see infra Part VI.B. Of the eighteen
decisions closely examined: plaintiffs in seven were elected deputies, four to local legis-
lative bodies, Voronezh (June 1, 2005), http://www.mmdc.narod.ru/caselaw/process 17/
decision.doc; Sverdlovsk (Jan. 28, 2004), http://www.femida.e-burg.ru/show doc.php?
id=3184; Vladimir (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.medialaw.ru/articlelO/7/2/04.htm; Sverd-
lovsk (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www.medialaw.ru/articlelO/7/2/13.htm, and three to the
federal parliament, Arkhangel'sk (approximately Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.cjes.ru/
femida/?page=2&a=ci&w=o&id=10; Saratov (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.medialaw.ru/
article 10/7/2/1 0.htm; Vladimir (Nov. 28, 2003), http://www.medialaw.ru/articlel0/7/2/
03.htm; plaintiffs in two were both local public administrators and the local administra-
tion itself (as a legal person), Riazan' (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.mmdc.narod.ru/
caselaw/process 18.html; Amur (Apr. 15, 2004), http://www.medialaw.ru/article0/7/2/
Ol.htm); the sole plaintiff in one was a local administration, Sverdlovsk (June 1, 2004),
http://www.sutyajnik.ru/rus/echr/rus judgments/distr/beliaev 01 06 2004.htm; and the
sole plaintiff in another was a local police official, Belgorod (Oct. 11, 2002),
http://www.medialaw.ru/articlel0/7/2/02.htm. In another case, the plaintiff was a faculty
member at a local university who also served as a consultant to the regional governor.
Voronezh (approximately Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.mmdc.narod.ru/caselaw/process
15.html. Plaintiffs in the other six disputes were private individuals. For discussion of the
standing of state and local agencies, as legal persons, to invoke defamation law, see dis-
cussion infra at Part VI.B.2.c. In seven of the disputes, the defendants also included third
persons (private individuals or public officials) who made the allegedly defamatory
statements (often in interview format) which then were disseminated by the defendant
mass media outlet. For discussion of this "media dissemination of third party content"
question, see discussion infra at Part VI.B.2.a.
146. See, e.g., V. Bykov & D. Shishkin, Stat 'ia 10 Evropeiskoi Konventsii o zashchite
prav cheloveka v grazhdanskikh protsessakh o zashchite dobrogo imeni [Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights in Civil Defamation Disputes],
ZAKONODATEL'STVO I PRAKTIKA MASS-MEDIA [LAW AND PRACTICE IN MASS MEDIA], Feb.
2002, http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/zip/90/1.htm. In this detailed exposition on
the potential usefulness of Article 10 and the ECtHR's practice, the authors, an attorney
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One other general observation may be made about the lower court de-
cisions. At least until the SC's October 10, 2003 Explanation, 48 the
courts were not acting under any form of compulsion from within the
judicial hierarchy in citing and applying ECtHR practice. The SC had not
ordained anything, nor had the CC. Thus, in terms of the operation of the
ordinary courts' hierarchy, it is evident that the lower courts were being
allowed to act independently and were indeed doing so. Thus, the
movement toward internalization was not a result of a "top-down" order-
ing from Moscow to the regions.
This period culminated in the 2005 Explanation. The increasing num-
ber of lower court decisions, while providing upward hydraulic pressure,
had been piecemeal and scattered; the 2005 Explanation, on the other
hand, consolidated the results of the lower courts' practice and made the
reconstruction of defamation law generally applicable throughout the
ordinary court system. 149 The SC Plenum did not intend the 2005 Expla-
nation to be a comprehensive analysis of the entire body of civil defama-
tion law.1') Rather, it was selective, while still addressing a number of
the most challenging issues. The 2005 Explanation is comprised of a
Preamble and nineteen sections addressing a variety of defamation law
questions. The Preamble and first section set forth the foundation for the
Explanation and general principles that apply to all subsequent sections.
The remaining sections address selected defamation issues and seek to
for an NGO (the Glasnost' Defense Foundation) and a newspaper (Vedomosti), stated
that: "We proceed from the premise that it will be necessary to create conditions in which
courts will be compelled to take into account the Convention, and, most of all, the prac-
tice of the European Court." See Resnik & Skolovskii, supra note 1.
147. For example, the impact of NGO lawyering is suggested in litigation that resulted
in Voronezh (Mar. 24, 2005), http://www.mmdc.narod.ru/caselaw/process_14.html. In
the July 21, 2004 trial court decision, where the defendant newspaper and reporter were
found guilty of defamation and ordered to pay 150,000 rubles in moral damages, they
were not represented by legal counsel. At the appellate court, they were represented by
lawyers from the Central-Chernozem Center, supra note 144, who included references to
ECtHR practice in their arguments. The appellate court set aside the trial court decision
in its entirety and entered a new judgment.
148. October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35.
149. The stated goal of the 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, was to advance the correct
and uniform application of the law. Id. Preamble, para. 6.
150. As indicated by the Explanation's title, see supra note 2, the Court sought to re-
view judicial practice in deciding defamation disputes. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Pream-
ble state that in general the courts are handling their responsibilities effectively in this
area, but that Russia's ratification of the ECHR has given rise to certain questions that
require resolution; as a result, the Explanation was necessary to advance correct and uni-
form application of the relevant legislation.
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clarify certain questions. We now turn to particular questions addressed
in the Explanation that reflect the ECtHR's influence.
A. The Fact/Opinion Distinction
For over a decade, the ordinary courts' treatment of all "communica-
tions" (svedeniia) as subject to Civil Code Article 152 had been the most
controversial aspect of the defamation law scheme.' 15 Indeed, the ques-
tion of whether the law should draw a legal distinction between state-
ments of fact and opinion goes back to the introduction of civil defama-
tion in the mid-1960s. 15 2 For example, in a series of Articles in 1997-98,
proposals for recognition of the distinction'5 3 drew a spirited response
from defenders of the existing structure. 
54
Beginning with its 1986 Lingens decision, the ECtHR took a very dif-
ferent approach. In Lingens, 55 a journalist was convicted under the
defamation provisions of Austria's Criminal Code for publishing two
articles sharply critical of the Austrian Chancellor.156 The Austrian courts
ruled that the statements were defamatory and that, under the burden of
persuasion stipulated in the Criminal Code, the defendant journalist had
not established their truthfulness. As a result, he was found guilty of
defamation and ordered to pay a monetary fine.157 In finding an Article
10 violation, the ECtHR articulated principles that it has voiced many
times since, namely that Article 10 requires that expression of "value
151. A detailed analysis, including discussion of a number of ordinary court decisions,
is found in E.A. Chefranova, Kommentarii, in Monika Makovei & E.A. Chefranova,
Evropeiskaia Konventsiia o zashchite pray cheloveka i osnovykh svobod." Stat'ia 10.
Pravo na svobodu vyrazheniia svoego mneniia. [European Convention on Human Rights
Defense & Primary Freedom: Article 10, Freedom to Express Opinion] PRETSENDENTY I
KOMMENTARII [PRECEDENT & COMMENTARY] 84-109 (2001), available at
http://www.sutyajnik.ru/rus/echr/schoo/books/artl0.pdf
152. See discussion of the differing views of Soviet scholars concerning the proper
meaning of svedeniia in A.V. BELIAVSKII & N.A. PRIDVOROV, OKHRANA CHESTI I
DOSTOINSTVA LICHNOSTI V SSSR [PROTECTION OF HONOR AND DIGNITY IN THE USSR],
53-59 (1971).
153. See Erdelevskii, supra note 106; Poliakov, supra note 106.
154. A. Cherdantsev, A. Mozhno osporit' i mnenie [Opinions also may be disputed],
ROssIIsKAIA IUSTITSIIA, Nov. 1997, at 51; V. Kazantsev & N. Korshunov, V kakikh slu-
chaiakh kompensiruetsia moral 'nyi vred? [In what circumstances should moral harm be
compensated?], ROsSIISKAIA IUSTITSIIA, Feb. 1998, at 39, 40; L. Gros', Eshche raz o
svobode mneniia i zashchite chesti [Once again about freedom of opinion and protection
of honor], RossIlSKAIA IUSTITSIIA, Sept. 1998, at 19.
155. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11 (1986).
156. Id.
157. Id. paras. 21-29.
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judgments" must be distinguished from assertions of fact. 58 Value judg-
ments, the ECtHR declared, are not susceptible to evidentiary means of
proof, and a defamation defendant cannot be required to prove their
truth. 5 9 Having determined that the journalist's communications were
value judgments, the ECtHR assessed his conviction under the "neces-
sary in a democratic society" requirement in Article 10(2) and found that
Austria had failed to satisfy it. 1
60
The ordinary courts' internalization of ECtHR practice, particularly
Lingens, has been decisive in the turnaround in Russia's approach to the
fact/opinion question. This has been illustrated abundantly both in the
lower courts' practice and in the 2005 Explanation. Starting with the Ka-
relia decision, a number of lower court decisions used various devices to
implement the fact/opinion distinction. Some courts, following Lingens
closely, declined to put the burden of proving the truth on the defen-
dant.' 61 Others narrowly construed the terms "communications" or "de-
famatory meaning" in Article 152 to rule that the statements in questions
did not qualify as one or the other: as a result, the plaintiffs failed to state
actionable claims under Article 152.162
In the 2005 Explanation, the SC sought to resolve the fact/opinion dis-
tinction definitively. 63 The Court noted that Article 152(1) of the Civil
Code requires the defendant to prove the truth of a defamatory commu-
nication in order to avoid liability. 64 However, citing the "position" of
the ECtHR in interpreting Article 10,165 the SC set forth a rule that courts
must distinguish between allegations of fact and statements of opinion.
The latter, the SC declared, cannot be the basis for judicial protection of
reputation under Article 152 of the Civil Code because, as a subjective
expression of the opinion and views of the defendant, they cannot be
made subject to a test for proof of their accuracy. 166 In this way, by de-termining that statements of opinions cannot be "communications" (sve-
158. Id. para. 46.
159. Id.
160. Id. para. 47.
161. Sverdlovsk Civil Chamber Decision, supra note 122; Amur (Apr. 15, 2004), su-
pra note 145.
162,. Nizhnii Novgorod (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.sutyajnik.ru/rus/echr/rus
judgments/distr/sannikov 20_12_2002.html; Sverdlovsk (Nov. 12, 2003), supra note
145; Sverdlovsk (June 1, 2004), supra note 145.
163. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 9.
164. Id.
165. Regarding the SC's emphasis on the notion of the ECtHR "positions" (pozitsiia),
see discussion infra Part VI.A.2.
166. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 9, para. 3.
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deniia),167 the SC categorically excluded them from the scope of Article
152.
Of particular note is the fact that the SC did not establish any grada-
tions in articulating this rule, such as considering the status of the plain-
tiff. However, in a further paragraph, the SC informed the courts that
public officials who seek to enlist public opinion must, at the same time,
be the object of political discussion and criticism in the mass media.
168
Public officials, the court added, must be subject to criticism in the mass
media in regard to the performance of their duties because this is a nec-
essary condition for the open and responsible performance of their pow-
ers. 169 The SC's purpose in making these statements is not clear. The Ex-
planation does not state how they are to be applied in judicial practice,
and by making some reference to the status of the plaintiff as a relevant
consideration, they appear to contradict the categorical character of the
rule set forth in section 9, paragraph 3.
The SC did, however, point out an important exception that is outside
the strict defamation context: the possibility that an expression of opinion
might be subject to liability as an "insult." The SC stated:
If a subjective opinion was expressed in an insulting form, harming the
plaintiffs honor, dignity, or business reputation, an obligation might be
imposed an the defendant to pay compensation for the plaintiff's moral
harm suffered as a result of the insult (Article 130 of the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation, Articles 150 and 151 of the Civil Code of
the Russian Federation).
170
As this statement indicates, the SC's closing of the door to defamation
actions based on Article 152 for statements of opinion may be expected
to increase the number of lawsuits based on other statutory provisions. In
this regard, the statutory employment of the words "honor" (chest') and
"dignity" (dostoinstvo) in both Article 152 of the Civil Code and Article
167. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
168. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 9, para. 4.
169. id. The SC did not cite to ECtHR practice in citing these propositions, although
they are closely related to principles articulated in the ECtHR's Lingens line of cases.
However, the SC did base paragraph 4 on a "Declaration on Freedom of Political Debate
in the Media," adopted by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on February
12, 2004. The Declaration incorporates a number of principles that the ECtHR has set
forth in its practice. EUR. PARL. Ass., Delaration on Freedom of Political Debate in the
Media, 872d Sess., Doe. No. 87215.1E (Feb. 12, 2004), available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=l 18995.
170. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 9, para. 6. As stated supra in Part V.A. L.b, the
Civil Code does not refer to insult (oskorblenie). However, the courts have incorporated
its definition and elements from Article 130 of the Criminal Code into Articles 150 and
151 to establish a civil cause of action for harm to individual dignity.
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130 of the Criminal Code likely will serve to perpetuate the blurring of
the distinction between defamation and insult, even though they have
distinct elements and seek to advance different interests.1
7'
Another important aspect of the Explanation is indirectly linked to the
fact/opinion matter. For the first time, the SC determined that the defa-
mation plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the communication in
question was defamatory in meaning 7'-a matter of considerable impor-
tance in judicial practice. 73 The imposition of this burden on the plaintiff
reinforces the SC's exclusion of statements of opinion from the scope of
Article 152. Because a statement of opinion cannot be a "communica-
tion," it cannot have a defamatory meaning for purposes of satisfying the
elements of Article 152.174
B. Distinction Between Defamation and Invasion of Privacy
The 2005 Explanation took an important step in clarifying the distinc-
tion, often lost in judicial practice, between the elements that distinguish
defamation claims from invasion of privacy. Protection of privacy is,
along with protection of reputation, a protected interest in Article 150 of
the Civil Code.175 In the Explanation, the SC pointed out that an individ-
ual may suffer an actionable injury for invasion of privacy-even if the
communication was factually accurate-if the communication concerned
that person's private life. 176 At the same time, the Explanation also added
that a claim for invasion of privacy is not actionable if the communica-
tion in question was disseminated by a media outlet in order to protect
public interests. 177
171. See Potapenko 2005, supra note 39, at 8. In this regard, it should be noted that the
Chemodurov application found admissible by the ECtHR on August 30, 2005 concerns
insult. Among the applicant's arguments to the ECtHR is that the insult cause of action is
not "prescribed by law," as required under Article 10(2) of the ECHR. Chemodurov v.
Russia, App. No. 72683/01, Eur. Ct. H.R (2005). See further discussion regarding insult
infra Part VI.B.2.d.
172. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 9, para. I. The Explanation also revised some-
what the definition of "defamatory meaning" from that found in its predecessor. Id. § 7,
para. 4. However, it is not possible to determine if this was prompted by plurality princi-
ple concerns. Meanwhile, it should be noted that section 7, paragraph 4 says that "de-
famatory" statements [svedeniia] are statements about facts or events. Thus, the use of
svedeniia lends itself to the notion that the only communications that can be defamatory
are assertions of fact.
173. See Potapenko 2005, supra note 39, at 7; Golovanov 2005, supra note 123.
174. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
175. See discussion supra Part IV.A. I.b.
176. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 8, para. 2.
177. Id. In support of this proposition the SC cited the Mass Media Law, supra note 85,
art. 49.5, and added, applying the plurality principle, that this norm is consistent with
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C. Monetary Compensation for Harm to Reputation
The 2005 Explanation placed two new requirements on the courts in
their determinations of the amount of monetary compensation for
"moral" harm, which the Civil Code defines as "physical or mental suf-
fering."'' 78 The new requirements are in addition to the Code's criteria of
considering the victim's degree of physical and mental suffering (in light
of the victim's individual characteristics) and the circumstances in which
the harm was inflicted. 179 Furthermore, the Code requires the court to
consider "the requirements of reasonableness and justice" in making the
calculation'"0 and to take into account "other circumstances worthy of
attention."'81
From these Code provisions, the SC fashioned the new standards in
section 15 of the 2005 Explanation.1 82 First, section 15 requires that the
amount of compensation for a non-economic harm must be proportionate
(sorazmerna) to the harm-a standard clearly adopted from the ECtHR's
position on the proportionality of damages in defamation cases.8 3 Sec-
ond, in recognition of concerns that high damages awards might unduly
burden the mass media, section 15 dictates that the amount of damages
must not result in an "encroachment (uskchemlenie) on the freedom of
mass information. ' 84 This certainly is an indeterminate standard, but one
which conveys recognition of free press interests in the assessment of
damages. Both steps again illustrate the SC's power and willingness in
certain circumstances to refine applicable legislative acts.
Article 8 of the ECHR ("Right to Respect for Private and Family Life"). This growing
public/private orientation of personality rights protection in Russia is one of the clearest
indicators of new directions in Russian "defamation" (in the broad sense) law.
178. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 151(1).
179. Id. arts. 151(2), 1101(2). The Code also generally requires assessment of the vio-
lator's degree of fault; however, an exception is made for defamation cases, where con-
sideration of fault is excluded from the calculation. Id. This exclusion is in keeping with
the fact that in defamation liability is not fault-based.
180. Id. art. 1101(2).
181. Id. art. 151(2).
182. Section 15 of the 2005 Explanation also expressly retained from the 1992 Expla-
nation its controversial interpretation of Article 152 of the Civil Code that makes legal
persons eligible to recover compensation for non-economic harms to business reputation.
See 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 15. For further consideration of this point, and its
possible conflict with the SC's proportionality requirement, see discussion infra notes
252-53.
183. Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 22 (2005); Tolstoy
Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, 316 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 (1995). See also Potapenko 2005,
supra note 39, at 10.
184. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 15, para. 2.
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VI. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RE-EXAMINATION OF DEFAMATION LAW:
THE SUPREME COURT'S "TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIRECTIVE"
Lower court practice and the 2005 Explanation have reshaped impor-
tant aspects of Russian defamation law. However, the SC did not intend
that the Explanation be a comprehensive review of all civil defamation
law. I85 Instead, the Explanation addressed certain pressing problems-
most of all, the fact/opinion question. In this regard, it can be said that
the Explanation for the most part settled the particular problems dis-
cussed above in Part V.
Meanwhile, however, a number of other questions presented under the
civil defamation system remain unresolved. 186 The Explanation referred
to some of these without resolving them, or did not address them at all.
The question therefore arises as to whether the new directions of the past
several years have any relevance for these "unresolved" areas. Will the
current trend of reassessment continue, as reflected in the 2005 Explana-
tion's recognition of the plurality principle and internalization of ECtHR
practice? If so, will any of the unresolved areas be addressed through the
perspective of the new approaches developed over the past several years?
One may expect that impetus will remain to address these questions,
although the degree of its intensity must await further developments.
However, certain considerations do suggest that attention will be given to
further applications of the plurality principle and internalization of
ECtHR practice. These include the continuing growth of the ECtHR's
Article 10 practice, the continuing number of Russia-based applications
to the ECtHR, the SC's "take into account" mandate, and the continued
activity of NGOs.
If this set of assumptions is valid, before examining some of the unre-
solved questions, it is necessary to examine in detail the SC's "take into
account" directive, as set forth in the October 10, 2003 Explanation and
reiterated in the 2005 Explanation. It may be expected that much of the
future direction of defamation law in Russia, as well as other areas of law
implicating freedom of the press, will be decided under the general rubric
of the "take into account" mandate. This is because, having recognized
the major impact of the ECtHR's influence, the SC through its mandate
has initiated a process where courts, practitioners, and scholars will seek
to define further the legal effect in Russia's legal system of the ECtHR's
Article 10 practice, at least in those areas of the ordinary courts' compe-
tence.
185. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
186. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
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A. The "Take into Account" Directive
Although the text of the Constitution states that international agree-
ments to which Russia is a party are binding internally in the Russian
legal system,' 87 it does not address the general question of the legal effect
of external interpretations of binding treaty norms. The Russian Law on
Treaties also is silent on the matter. 188 The Russian Parliament, however,
did address the question to some extent in regard to the ECtHR in the
March 30, 1998 ECHR Accession Act, which stated in relevant part that:
The Russian Federation, in accord with Article 46 of the Convention,
recognizes ipsofacto and without special agreement the mandatory ju-
risdiction of the European Court of Human Rights on questions con-
cerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and its
Protocols in connection with asserted violations by the Russian Federa-
tion of provisions of these agreements, when the asserted violation has
taken place after their entry into force for the Russian Federation. 1
89
This text, however, is ambiguous. One reasonable reading would suggest
that it simply addresses Russia's recognition of the ECtHR's competence
to rule on the substantive merits of applications filed against Russia, but
states nothing explicit regarding the domestic legal effect of the ECtHR's
substantive rulings. Therefore, in the absence of constitutional authority
or a clear directive from the legislature, the question of the legal effect of
the ECtIIR interpretations has been left up to Russia's courts.
The question of the legal effect of external interpretations of binding
treaty norms is one of increasing visibility and acuity in domestic legal
systems. 90 In the United States, it has arisen in the context of litigation
concerning the effect of International Court of Justice decisions interpret-
ing the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.' 9' As to the ECtHR
interpretations of the ECHR, it has been addressed, for example, in the
187. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15(4).
188. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
189. ECHR Accession Act, supra note 95, art. I (translated by author). This language
appears to have been grafted from former Article 46(1) of the ECHR, before it was
amended pursuant to ECHR Protocol No. 11, which entered into force on November 1,
1998.
190. See supra note 12 (citing various commentaries).
191. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). For a detailed study
of the problem before Sanchez-Llamas, see Heather Finstuen, Comment, From the World
Court to Oklahoma Court: The Significance of Torres v. State for International Court of
Justice Authority, Individual Rights, and the Availability of Remedy in Vienna Conven-
tion Disputes, 58 OKLA. L. Rev. 255 (2005). Regarding the International Court of Justice
generally in the United States, see Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 787 (1998).
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United Kingdom192 and Germany. 93 In Russia, in theory, the possible
answers would appear to range from treating such interpretations as bind-
ing precedent, to giving them a less intensive legal effect,' 94 to making
their use totally permissive, to denying their recognition in any manner.
While signaling to the lower courts their expected posture toward Arti-
cle 10 and the treatment of ECtHR practice, the SC's "take into account"
directive, in the October 10, 2003 and 2005 Explanations, is indetermi-
nate as to its scope and to the nature of the legal effect to be given to
ECtHR "positions" (to use the term employed in the 2005 Explanation).
As a threshold matter, what are ECtHR "positions?" Are they the opera-
tive parts of ECtHR judgments only, and perhaps only those in cases in
which Russia was a party? Or, is the category of "positions" broader to
include the reasoning in the ECtHR's case law? Beyond this question,
what does the phrase "take into account" mean? Does it require the
treatment of ECtHR positions as binding precedent, or something more
akin to persuasive authority? Also, when an ECtHR position is applica-
ble in a concrete case, how will this affect a court's approach to the ap-
plicable legislative acts?
1. The "Take into Account" Requirement and the Legal Effect of
ECtHR Practice
As demonstrated by the SC's general pronouncements and the specifics
of particular provisions in the Explanations, "take into account" appears
to be comprised of two closely related components: (1) a prescription to
avoid violations of the ECHR; and (2) implementation of this precept,
192. See discussion infra note 198 concerning the 1998 U.K. Human Rights Act. See
also Ian Sinclair, Susan J. Dickson & Graham Maciver, National Treaty Law & Practice:
United Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 727, 742.
193. See discussion infra note 198 (concerning the German Federal Constitutional
Court's October 14, 2004 decision).
194. These considerations reflect the comparative observation that the degree of "bind-
ingness" of judicial decisions in legal systems can be viewed as a continuum. See D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Further General Reflections and Conclusions, in
INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 531, 545 (D. Neil MacCormick &
Robert S. Summers eds., 1997). Therefore judicial decisions can carry something "less
than formally binding normative force." See Zenon Bankowski, D. Neil MacCormick,
Lech Morawski & Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Rationales for Precedent, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS, 497-500 (1997). In sum, Bankowski et aL., call for consideration of a "de-
cidedly non-monolithic approach to the concepts of precedent and of stare decisis." Id. at
497. In this regard, see the detailed discussion of three "models of reasoning from prece-
dent" (labeled the "model of particular analogy," the "rule-stating model," and the "prin-
ciple-exampling model") set forth by Bankowski et al., id., and their applicability to the
Russian context, in Marchenko, supra note 12, at 12, 19.
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when a legislative act is in question, by means of statutory construction.
The first of these focuses on anticipation of future ECtHR decisions in-
volving Russia as a party, an exercise that must entail examination of the
ECtHR's extensive practice. The second, while cognizant of the first,
shifts its primary focus to proper judicial construction of the Russian
statute that is applicable in the case before the court (e.g., Article 152 of
the Civil Code).
195
a. "Avoidance of Violation"
The SC's directives do not speak in terms of the binding nature of
ECtHR practice and nothing in the SC's practice suggests that the Ple-
num had in mind such a mandatory effect. On the other hand, the manda-
tory nature of the SC's prescriptions, including the susceptibility to re-
versal by a reviewing court, 196 rules out the possibility of an open-ended
grant to the ordinary courts of unreviewable discretion to consider
ECtHR interpretations as simply a form of persuasive authority.
Instead, it is apparent that "take into account" envisions a mid-level
degree of bindingness' 97 that can be characterized in this fashion: the
courts are required to act preventively, to avoid an unreasonably high
level of risk that their decisions ultimately will result in findings of viola-
tion by the ECtHR. 198 I will call this an "avoidance of violation" stan-
195. It is important to note, given the allocation of judicial competencies, supra Part
II.A, that this function differs from judicial review of the compatibility of legislative acts
with constitutional norms, a matter which gave rise to controversy between the SC and
the CC. See supra note 27. Instead, this is not judicial review at all, because it is not test-
ing the compatibility of any act with a superior norm with an eye toward possible invali-
dation of the former. Rather, it is using judicial construction of legislative acts in order to
insure that neither the legislative act nor judicial acts applying it are deemed by a poten-
tially subsequent decision maker-the ECtHR-to be incompatible with an international
(not constitutional) norm.
The CC often confronts in its admissibility decisions the question of whether a
purported constitutional infirmity is the result of a legislative act or judicial act. The an-
swer determines whether or not the CC has competence. See supra notes 28-29 and ac-
companying text.
196. October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35, § 9. Section 9 states that an ordi-
nary court's failure to apply correctly international norms will be subject to reversal by a
reviewing court.
197. See MacCormick & Summers, supra note 194, at 545.
198. A mandate for courts to "take into account" ECtHR practice is also found in at
least two other domestic legal systems. The 1998 U.K. Human Rights Act, Chapter 42,
Article 2 ("Interpretation of Convention Rights") states in relevant part:
(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection
with a Convention right must take into account any-
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dard. My conclusion is based in part on the text of the October 10, 2003
Explanation, which states that the courts must take into account ECtHR
practice in order to avoid violations of the ECRR.' 99 The SC cited both
the ECHR Accession Act 200 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights ....
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, art. 2 (Eng.), in 7 Halsbury's Statutes of England &
Wales 528 (4th ed. 2001), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 464 (1999), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm. The Act came into force on Octo-
ber 1, 2000. Id. See also European Commission for Democracy Through the Law, Inter-
national Conference on the Influence of the ECHR Case-Law on National Constitutional
Jurisprudence, Kyiv, Ukr., Oct. 13-16, 2005: The Influence of the ECHR on English
Law: Before and After the Human Rights Act, at 3 (Sept. 10, 2005) (prepared by Rt. Hon.
Lord Justice Maurice Kay) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) ("It
is to be noted that the requirement is that the national court or tribunal 'takes into ac-
count' such judgments, decisions, declarations and opinions, not that it is obliged to give
effect to them."). For extensive analysis of Article 2(l) of the Human Rights Act, see
Roger Masterman, Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a
'Municipal Law of Human Rights' under the Human Rights Act, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
907 (2005) and Roger Masterman, Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: Binding
Domestic Courts to Strasbourg, (2004) P.L. 725, 73 1-35.
The German Federal Constitutional Court also has adopted the "take into ac-
count" phrase for its standard for the legal effect of ECtHR practice. In its October 14,
2004 decision, the German Court stated:
"Take into account" means taking notice of the Convention provision as inter-
preted by the (ECtHR] and applying it to the case, provided the application
does not violate prior-ranking law, in particular constitutional law. In any
event, the Convention provision as interpreted by the [ECtHR] must be taken
into account in making a decision; the court must at least duly consider it.
Where the facts have changed in the meantime or in the case of a different fact
situation, the courts will need to determine what, in the view of the ECtHR,
constituted the specific violation of the Convention and why a changed fact
situation does not permit it to be applied to the case.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 2 Entscheidungen des
Burdesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1481 (2004), available at http://www.bundes
verfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20041014 2bvrl48104en.html, translated in 25
H.R.L.J. 99 (2004). In the German original, the word in paragraph 62 that is translated as
"take into account" is "bericksichtigen." Id.
Thus, it should be noted that both of these approaches (U.K. and Germany) ac-
knowledge the binding nature of the applicable ECHR provision, but to some extent leave
it up to the courts to decide whether or not to adopt the ECtHR's interpretation of that
provision. The Russian SC's "avoidance of violation" standard appears to require more of
the courts than this.
199. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
200. October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35, § 10, para. 3. For the relevant text
of the ECHR Accession Act, supra note 95, see supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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Treaties, 20 1 to which Russia is a party, in articulating this standard.20 2 My
conclusion also is based on other SC pronouncements and other indica-
tors.203 For example, while it did not recite the October 10, 2003 Expla-
nation's "in order to avoid violations of the ECHR" language in the "take
into account" requirement, the 2005 Explanation did generally incorpo-
rate the earlier Explanation in its entirety.20 4 The SC's December 19,
2003 Explanation also suggested that findings of violation by the ECtHR
were among the SC's highest concerns, 205 as did the general atmosphere
of concern regarding the status of Russian-based applications at the
ECtHR at the December 23, 2004 SC Plenum.20 6
In sum, the chief guide to the ECHR is the interpretive practice of the
ECtHR. Thus, prior ECtHR decisions serve chiefly as guides for antici-
pation of future ECtHR determinations, rather than binding precedent in
themselves.
b. Canon of Construction
As a practical matter then, what approach is a court to take in order to
avoid conflict with the ECtHR's Article 10 practice? In other words, in a
given case, if the ordinary court chooses to recognize and apply the
ECHR as an active source of law, as evidenced by elements of ECtHR
interpretations, what exactly is the court to do with this finding in the
event of a potential conflict between the applicable legislative act and the
ECHR?
201. October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35, § 10, paras. 1-2. Article 31(3)(b) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), to which the SC cited, states:
3. [In the interpretation of a treaty] [t]here shall be taken into account, together
with the context:
(b) [a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation ....
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), opened for signature May 23,
1969, 25 I.L.M. 543, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Adopted on May 22, 1969, the VCLT entered
into force on January 27, 1980. Id.
202. October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35, § 10, paras. 1, 3.
203. For an earlier proposal recommending an approach similar to "avoidance of viola-
tion," see S.A. Gorshkova, Rossiia i iuridicheskie posledstviia reshenii Evropeiskogo
suda po pravam cheloveka [Russia and the Judicial Consequences of the European
Court's Decisions Concerning Human Rights] ZH.R.P.., May-June 2000, at 91, 92, 100-
101.
204. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 1, para. 4.
205. See supra note 120.
206. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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One option would be that dictated by the SC's October 31, 1995 Ex-
planation: if the applicable legislation conflicts with the ECHR, then the
court should make a ruling of invalidity. 2 7 However, the more recent
"take into account" standard does not appear to require or endorse this
approach. The SC in the October 10, 2003 and 2005 Explanations did not
mandate the "judicial review" directive of the 1995 Explanation.
Instead of requiring the courts to act as bodies of constitutional control,
invalidating legislative acts deemed inconsistent with the ECtHR's Arti-
cle 10 practice, it appears that the SC expects the ordinary courts to em-
ploy statutory construction to ward off future ECtHR findings of viola-
tion. While not explicitly expressing it as something resembling a canon
of statutory construction, the SC itself demonstrated the use of this ap-
proach in its treatment of the fact/opinion question in the 2005 Explana-
tion. 0 Under this approach, the courts need not, and should not, hold
Article 152 of the Civil Code invalid; instead, they should construe it so
as to make it unavailable to plaintiffs who seek recourse against state-
ments of opinion. Thus, the SC is steering a path between the risks of
future Russian violations at the ECtHR and the controversial step of in-
validating legislative acts (here, the prestigious Civil Code).
20 9
This much seems clear. However, what the 2005 Explanation did not
do is explore the implications of the "ECtHR Practice/Positions" compo-
nent of the "take into account" directive. It is necessary to attempt to do
this if we are to assess the further implications of the 2002-2005 new
directions for defamation law questions unsettled after the 2005 Explana-
tion.
207. Regarding the 1995 Explanation, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
208. See discussion supra at notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
209. This latter observation is made in light of the controversy in the 1990s, now sub-
stantially diminished, between the SC and the CC over the latter's claims that the SC was
intruding impermissibly into the CC's exclusive competence. See supra note 27.
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2. The Nature of ECtHR "Practice" and/or "Positions 210
ECtHR decisions, both judgments and admissibility determinations, are
required to set forth not only operative parts, but also the Court's reason-
ing.21 ' The SC's October 10, 2003 Explanation did not define what it
meant by ECtHR "practice." It is possible that it meant one of the follow-
ing: (1) to limit "practice" to the operative parts of judgments in cases in
which Russia is a party, thereby excluding the ECtHR's reasons; (2) to
require or encourage the courts to reason by analogy from ECtHR deter-
minations, whether or not they involve Russia as a party; or (3) to give
some level of legal effect to the ECtHR's reasons, as reflected in its ar-
ticulated "positions" in all its decisions-not just those in which Russia
is or was a party.
It is evident that the SC intended the third of these options. Certainly,
the courts are required to recognize and give binding effect to the opera-
tive parts of ECtHR judgments that find a Russian violation.1 2 However,
at least in regard to defamation, this never was an issue in the period in
question, since the first ECtHR judgment against Russia in an Article 10
case was not rendered until July 2005.213 Instead, the issue leading up to
and including the 2005 Explanation was whether the reasoning in the full
210. The October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35, § 10, uses "praktika" [prac-
tice], but the 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, uses the word "pozitsiia" [positions] (twice
using "pravovye pozitsii" [legal positions]). Because the latter was more recent and was
devoted specifically to defamation, as well as the growing currency in Russian legal
thought that the term is acquiring, I will use the term "positions" when either term might
be applicable. See L.V. LAZAREV, PRAVOVYE POZITSII KONSTITUTSIONNOGO SUDA Rossi1
(2003); N.S. Volkova, Priemyformirovaniia pravovoi pozilsii Konstitututsionnogo Suda
RF [The Methods of Forming Legal Positions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation], ZH.R.P., Sep. 2005, at 79; Potapenko 2005, supra note 39. As demonstrated
in the literature concerning CC jurisprudence, pravovye pozitsii is used to designate more
than just operative parts of judgments.
211. ECHR Article 45, paragraph 1, states in full: "Reasons shall be given for judg-
ments as well as for decisions declaring applications admissible or inadmissible."
ECHR, supra note 3, art. 45, para. 1. The operative part of an ECtIR judgment is that
which states whether or not there has been a violation, and if there has, what the appli-
cant's remedy is.
212. This is true both as a matter of Russia's international obligations, per ECHR Arti-
cle 46, paragraph 1 (which states in full that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties." ECHR,
supra note 3, art. 46, para. 1.) and its domestic law. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 46(3), translated in BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at
646 ("Everyone shall have a right, in accordance with international treaties of the Russian
Federation, to apply to inter-state organs concerned with the protection of human rights
and freedoms if all available domestic remedies of legal protection have been ex-
hausted."); ECHR Accession Act, supra note 95.
213. Grinberg v. Russia, App. No. 23472/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
[Vol. 32:1
INTERNALIZING ECHR INTERPRETATIONS
range of the ECtHR's extensive Article 10 practice must be given some
legal effect as a matter of domestic law.
Although the October 10, 2003 Explanation did not define "practice,"
it made clear that courts would be expected to do more than simply ob-
serve and implement the specific requirements of operative parts of
ECtHR judgments in which Russia was a defendant. In addition to this,
the Court stated that Russia must:
take steps of a general character, in order to prevent the repetition of
similar violations. Courts within the limits of their competency there-
fore must insure compliance with the state's obligations that result from
Russia's accession to the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms.
214
Subsequent Explanations also demonstrate that the SC intended that
the term "practice" include the ECtHR's reasons. This is demonstrated,
for example, in the December 19, 2003 Explanation's requirement of
explicit citations in ordinary court judgments to "decisions of the
ECtHR, in which were rendered interpretations of the ECHR's provi-
sions" applied by the Russian court.21 5 Most significantly, the 2005 Ex-
planation, addressing specifically civil defamation law, pronounced em-
phatically and in detail on this aspect of the "take into account" require-
ment. For example: (1) the courts must interpret the provisions of ECHR
Article 10 in conformity with ECtHR positions (pozitsii), articulated in
its judgments;21 6 (2) in deciding reputation disputes, courts must follow
not only Article 152 of the Civil Code, but also Article I of the ECHR
Accession Act to take into account the positions of the ECtHR, articu-
lated in its judgments, concerning interpretation and application of the
ECHR (especially Article 10);217 and (3) in a concrete application of this
approach, the SC addressed specific defamation law issues, in particular
the application of the ECtHR's positions regarding the fact/opinion dis-
218tinction. In sum, "positions" as employed in the 2005 Explanation (or
"practice," in the wording of the October 10, 2003 Explanation) should
be read to mean "reasons" in all ECtHR decisions (both judgments and
admissibility decisions.) ECtHR positions, therefore, include more than
just operative parts of judgments or reasons in a specific judgment
against Russia that the Russian courts are asked to recognize and enforce.
214. October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35, § 11, para. 2.
215. December 19, 2003 Explanation, supra note 120.
216. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, Preamble, para. 3.
217. Id. § 1, para. 5.
218. Id. § 9, para. 3.
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However, this is not quite the end of the inquiry, because it is neces-
sary also to determine with more precision the types of extractable ele-
ments that may be found in ECtHR positions. This is because the key
focus of the "take into account" requirement is the necessity of anticipat-
ing future ECtHR determinations-an exercise that will require, in addi-
tion to reasoning by analogy from the ECtHR's fact-intensive decisions,
close assessment of the prospective value of its positions.
Positions,21 9 as the SC appears to employ the term, are a court's inter-
pretations-developed pursuant to textual, teleological, or other method-
ologies-upon which its decisions are based.220 Positions are deemed to
be interpretations of prospective value as distinct from the ECtHR's fre-
quent fact-intensive determinations made pursuant to its proportionality
analysis under provisions such as ECHR Article 10(2)."'
For the purposes of this Article, it is useful to view the ECtHR posi-
tions as points on a continuum that ranges from high levels of abstraction
(e.g., a free press is essential to democratic governance) on one end to
specificity (e.g., prohibition against burdening a defendant with proving
the truth of an opinion) at the other. Perhaps highly abstract principles
are not the kinds of positions that the SC Plenum had in mind in formu-
lating the 2005 Explanation. On the other hand, in this author's opinion,
recognition of the relevance of such foundation principles is essential to
application of the inherent nature of the SC's "take into account" direc-
tive and its "avoidance of violation" standard.22 2
3. The Practical Consequences of the "Take into Account" Mandate
If observed and enforced with rigor in the first instance and higher or-
dinary courts, the "take into account" mandate has the potential to pose
considerable demands and logistical challenges on the courts and parties
in defamation disputes. The ECtHR's Article 10 practice is voluminous,
including a great many decisions on admissibility and inadmissibility of
219. "Positions" are an extractable element under "practice." The SC, here, appears to
be employing the notion of "positions" found in the CC's practice. See LAZAREV, supra
note 210 (suggesting the prospective value of ECtHR "Reasons").
220. Id. at 10.
221. Although the ECtHR usually sets forth Positions (often citing to earlier judg-
ments) in its decision, these often in themselves do not determine the result in the case.
Instead, the outcome often turns on fact-intensive proportionality analysis under the
"necessary in a democratic society" standard in Article 10(2). By themselves, these pro-
portionality determinations provide little prospective value, except for the opportunity to
reason by analogy from the facts.
222. The fact is that in many cases an explicit ECtHR position of high specificity




applications, 2 3 and is at times quite complex. For attorneys and the
courts this will place a high premium on familiarity with ECtHR prac-
tice, including even positions articulated in judgments where Russia was
224not a party. In turn, these demands will present logistical challenges,
such as insuring the availability of translations of ECtHR decisions.
225
B. Unresolved Questions Viewed Through the "Take into Account"
Prism
1. Public Interest Justifications
Many of the ECtHR's positions, particularly many principles reiterated
regularly in its Article 10 practice, are grounded in, or are extensions of,
instrumentalist public interest justifications that the ECtHR has identified
as undergirding the freedom of expression guarantees in Article 10.226
Although the Court regularly cites to both individual self-fulfillment and
public interest justifications for freedom of expression guarantees, the
latter generally receive far greater elaboration in cases involving the
223. It is possible that the SC did not intend to include ECtHR admissibility decisions
in the "take into account" standard. The October 10, 2003 Explanation, supra note 35, §
10, does not limit "praktika" to "Postanovleniia" (Decrees, or Judgments], but Article 1
of the 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, does use this term. However, in this author's opin-
ion, the inclusion of admissibility decisions would be more consistent with the SC's ap-
parent concerns. Admissibility decisions can be very instructive as to the thinking of the
ECtHR, and to ignore them would seem to blunt the force of the prospective, anticipatory
value of the "avoidance of violation" approach.
224. If this is the case, it does not of course necessarily mean that resolution of future
questions will be resolved in favor of free expression interests. Instead, it means that
courts (assisted by legal representatives) will need to probe the ECtHR's practice in seek-
ing to comply with the determination under the "avoidance of violation" approach of
whether a significant risk might be created that the ECtHR will find an ECHR violation.
225. Golovanov & Potapenko 2005, supra note 68, at 20-21, present an interesting
discussion about the practical problems of using ECtHR practice (e.g., translations of
judgments in cases not involving Russia). See also Danilenko, Implementation of Interna-
tional Law, supra note 6, at 69; Golovanov 2005, supra note 123, at 2.
226. Analysis of the ECtHR case law indicates the heavy reliance which the ECtHR
has placed on public interest theory in the development of many of its Positions. Much of
the ECtHR's practice in defamation cases is a cluster of assumptions concerning the role
of free expression guarantees: for example, that the exercise of rights guaranteed under
the ECHR not only enhances individual self-fulfillment, but also instrumentalist goals;
that of these institutional goals, primacy is accorded to the maintenance and promotion of
democratic governance; that the press plays an essential role in the maintenance of effec-
tive democratic governance; and that the press must be free in order to perform that role.
These assumptions, or principles, provide a rationale of considerable cumulative weight
when matched in the ECtHR's commonly used balancing methodology against other
individual or public interests.
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defamation context.227 Without public interest theories, little apparent
justification exists for giving greater weight to free expression interests at
the expense of the interest in protecting against harm to reputation.228
In Russia, the SC and some lower courts recently have recognized to a
limited extent the relevance of public interest considerations in the defa-
mation context. For example, this notion appears in the 2005 Explanation
in several ways: as a general foundation in the Preamble and Article I for
adoption of the plurality principle; as a directly applicable basis for the
SC's positions on invasion of privacy and its limits-in the case of mass
media defendants--on monetary compensation for non-economic harms;
and as a proposition (without specific applicability) relevant to the
fact/opinion distinction.229
Some lower court decisions have cited public interest justifications for
the protection of freedom of expression that the ECtHR has identified in
its practice. For example, they have used them to limit the construction
of "defamatory meaning," not only in regard to statements of opinion,
but even as to assertions of fact.230 They also have ruled that public offi-
cials must tolerate more criticism than private plaintiffs, 23' that the public
official status of a plaintiff should be taken into account in the assess-
ment of the amount of non-economic damages, 232 and that public interest
considerations are relevant to the question of the standing of public bod-
ies to seek recourse for harm to reputation.
2 33
In these early stages, however, this compilation of examples does not
point to development of a coherent, inter-connected body of principles
227. For example, compare the extensive elaboration of pubic interest theory in
Lingens to the brief reference to individual self-fulfillment in the same judgment. Lingens
v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11, 26 (1986). See also Grinberg v. Russia, App.
No. 23472/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), paras. 23-24.
228. For discussion of these two theories, including their respective benefits and limi-
tations, see Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74
CAL. L. REv. 761, 772 (1986) ("Even more significantly, self-expression theories do not
provide a reason for protecting those self-expressive activities that can cause harm to
others.").
229. See discussion supra Part V.
230. Karelia decision, supra note 109; Saratov (Jan. 21, 2004), supra note 145; Amur
(Apr. 15, 2004), supra note 145; Sverdlovsk (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.femida.e-
burg.ru/show doc.php?id=4015. See also Golovanov & Potapenko 2005, supra note 68,
at 15.
231. See, e.g., the November 28, 2003 Vladimir decision, supra note 145.
232. Sverdlovsk District Court Decision (Nov. 20, 2003), supra note 122.
233. See discussion infra at Part VI.13.2.c.
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for application in the practice of the ordinary courts.234 The references in
the 2005 Explanation, although seemingly not connected by a common
thread, provide evidence that there is some movement among the SC
judges toward consistent positions. At the same time, the dampening re-
vision of public interest language from an earlier draft of the Explanation
reveals what is perhaps considerable doctrinal ambivalence on these
questions. 13 Meanwhile, as will be discussed below, some lower courts
have attempted to develop approaches, based on ECtHR public interest
principles, toward some of the remaining unsettled questions in defama-
tion law.
It is evident that to meet the "take into account" standard, with its
"avoidance of violation" component, the courts will need to continue to
explore means of applying the ECtHR's emphasis on public interest jus-
tifications. For example, a particularly pressing question, reflected in
certain lower court decisions, is whether those considerations are best
met by: (1) focusing on the status of the plaintiff; (2) determining
whether the subject matter of the impugned communication was one of
public significance; or (3) choosing an approach that combines the
tWo. 23 6 This is a question that the U.S. Supreme Court struggled with in
the early 1970s: whether to condition the intensity of external norm in-
tervention into defamation disputes on case-by-case determinations of
the presence or absence of public significance in the impugned commu-
nication, or on a more categorical rule based on the status of the plain-
tiff.237 The 2005 Explanation's enigmatic language regarding public offi-
234. For example, one notes that the absence of public interest considerations in sec-
tion 9 of the 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, even though a series of such justifications
served as the foundation for the ECtHR's Lingens decision.
235. October 19, 2004 Draft Explanation, § 18 (Oct. 19, 2004) (on file with the Brook-
lyn Journal of International Lav). In this version, section 18, the forerunner of the final
version of section 15 in the 2005 Explanation, stated that when assessing damages for
non-material injury, a court must consider not only the Civil Code's criteria in Articles
151, paragraph 2, and 1101, paragraph 2, but also the "public interest in the dissemination
of information and good-faith commentary, and the necessity of promoting unfettered
discussion of questions of public significance." This is a stronger statement of public
interest considerations than those found in the somewhat nebulous formulation requiring
courts in assessing monetary compensation to avoid "infringement of the freedom of
mass information."
236. Regarding public officials, see S.V. Potapenko, Diffamatsiia i rossiskaia sudeb-
naia prcaktika v kontekste opyta Evropeiskogo suda po pravam cheloveka [Defamation
and Russian judicial practice in the context of the experience of the European Court of
Human Rights] KNIZH-NAIA POLKA "PRAVO i SMI," Item 43, 2004,
http://medialaw.ru/publications/books/echr2/index.html.
237. A plurality of the Court adopted the matter of public significance approach in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43-45 (1971). However, three years later, the
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cials in its discussion of the fact/opinion distinction238 appears to reflect
similar considerations, although its message is unclear. Overall, section 9
of the Explanation appears to present a categorical rule barring the avail-
ability of Civil Code Article 152 to all plaintiffs when the impugned
statement is an opinion. However, the Plenum's discussion about public
officials in section 9, paragraph 4, suggests that perhaps this bar is im-
posed only on public officials in regard to the performance of their du-
ties. As an alternative, the Plenum indicated that courts, in cases involv-
ing public official plaintiffs, should be more expansive in their assess-
ment of whether a particular communication is one of opinion. As it
stands, that discussion provides little concrete guidance to the lower
courts.
In sum, two general questions are presented by the ECtHR's practice
and the ordinary courts' growing attention to the public interest compo-
nents in that practice. The first is whether the scope of public interest
considerations will be extended to questions beyond those addressed
fully in the 2005 Explanation, and the second is how the practical appli-
cation of these justifications should be formulated.
2. Specific Questions
In defamation, as a general matter, the question of "interference" is set-
tled. The SC's positions in the 2005 Explanation are based on the SC's
conclusion that defamation law implicates the exercise of freedom of
expression. 23 9 Based on this, it is apparent that, unless the SC undertakes
a major reversal, it will eventually require the ordinary courts to extend
the plurality principle to defamation issues not addressed in the 2005 Ex-
planation.
This section examines certain questions which the SC has not exam-
ined through the perspective of the plurality principle. A number of
lower court decisions have applied the principle to some of these ques-
tions.
a. Media Dissemination of Third-Party Content
In a number of the lower court disputes examined in this study, jour-
nalists and mass media outlets were named as defendants along with, or
Court abandoned this approach in favor of the rule that a plaintiff deemed "private" will
confront a more relaxed constitutional standard than will a public official or public figure.
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
238. See discussion supra note 168 and accompanying text.
239. See 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, Preamble, § 1. These speak of protection of
reputation as a whole, without delineating specific aspects of it.
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in place of, third persons who were the originators of the impugned alle-
gations or opinions subsequently disseminated by the media defen-
dants.2 40 For example, these arise in regard to liability for publication or
broadcasting of an interview, or in regard to publication of a guest (non-
employee) commentator.2 41 The cases do not suggest the possibility that
distinctions between the originator and the disseminator might be legally
significant, although the Mass Media Law provides certain exemptions
for dissemination of government information.242
The ECtHR has addressed this question and adopted a position, quite
explicit, that the Russian courts should consider it under the "take into
account" requirement. In the case of Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. Den-
mark,243 the ECtHR Grand Chamber found that Denmark did not violate
Article 10 by convicting two journalists who were found to have made
allegations of fact, on the basis of an interview with an eyewitness of the
event in question, against a police official. In the judgment, the Grand
Chamber articulated a position on the general treatment under Article 10
of media dissemination of interviews and other statements by third par-
ties:
In news reporting based on interviews, a distinction also needs to be
made as to whether the statement emanates from the journalist or is a
quotation of others, since punishment of a journalist for assisting in the
240. Sverdlovsk (June 1, 2004), supra note 145; Amur (Apr. 15, 2004), supra note
145; Voronezh (approximately Feb. 17, 2004), supra note 145; Sverdlovsk (Jan. 28,
2004), supra note 145; Saratov (Jan. 21, 2004), supra note 145; Vladimir (Dec. 9, 2003)
(allegedly defamatory statements made at a news conference), supra note 145; Sverd-
lovsk (Nov. 12, 2003), supra note 145; Karelia (Mar. 12, 2002), supra note 109. Mean-
while, at least two of the pending cases before the ECtHR-Filatenko v. Russia and
Dyuldin & Kislov v. Russia-also fall into this category of cases. See Filatenko v. Russia,
App. No. 73219/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Dyuldin & Kislov v. Russia, App. No.
25698/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).
241. Sverdlovsk (June 1, 2004), supra note 145 (newspaper interview: guest inter-
viewee); Voronezh (approximately Feb. 17, 2004), supra note 145 (newspaper column:
guest commentator); Sverdlovsk (Jan. 28, 2004), supra note 145 (newspaper and televi-
sion interviews: guest interviewee); Saratov (Jan. 21, 2004), supra note 145 (newspaper
interview: guest interviewee); Vladimir (Dec. 9, 2003), supra note 145 (newspaper publi-
cation of local public official's news conference); Sverdlovsk (Nov. 12, 2003), supra
note 145 (television interview: guest interviewee).
242. Journalists may not be held liable for information that originated in press releases
of state authorities, organizations, agencies, companies, or public associations or if such
information is a verbatim reproduction of statements by officials of state authorities, or-
ganizations or public associations. Mass Media Law, supra note 85, art. 57(3)-(4).
243. Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. Denmark, App. No. 68693/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).
Lending particular weight to Pedersen is the fact that it was decided by the ECtHR Grand
Chamber. For discussion of Pedersen, see Kozlowski, supra note 51, at 152-53.
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dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview
would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of
matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are
particularly strong reasons for doing so. Moreover, a general require-
ment for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves
from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or
damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press's role of pro-
viding information on current events, opinions and ideas.
244
This position provides a basis upon which the Russian ordinary courts
could examine the facts of a dispute to apply a material distinction be-
tween circumstances in which a journalist or news media outlet is acting
as repeater, and therefore should be insulated from liability, or has added
its own factual assertions based on the third person's statements. Resolu-
tion of these questions perhaps could be pursued via interpretation of
"communication" (svedenie) or "defamatory meaning" in Article 152 of
the Civil Code along the lines of the SC's canon of construction under
the "take into account" requirement.
b. Monetary Compensation to Legal Persons for Non-Economic Harm
The Civil Code is ambiguous on a question that has received consider-
able attention: whether a legal person has standing to recover monetary
compensation for non-economic harm to its business reputation.245 Under
one reading, Article 152(7) of the Civil Code states that the rules of Arti-
cle 152 concerning business reputation of a "citizen" apply to legal per-
sons as well as the grazhdanin (physical person). Under another, they are
not eligible because it is not possible for a legal person to experience
"moral harm," which Article 151 of the Code defines as "physical and
mental suffering."
246
Russia's three high courts have addressed this question in various
ways. The SC consistently has directed the ordinary courts to permit le-
gal persons to seek moral damages.247 Also construing Article 152 of the
Civil Code, but in the opposite way, the Presidium of the Supreme Arbi-
trazh Court in three separate supervisory decisions in the late 1990s ruled
that legal persons were not eligible for the moral damages remedy due to
their lack of capacity to experience physical and mental suffering.
248
244. Pedersen & Baadsgaard, supra note 243, para. 77.
245. Krug, Harm to Business Reputation, supra note 26.
246. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF (GK] [Civil Code] art. 151(1).
247. 1992 Explanation, supra note 34, § 11; 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 15.
Regarding section 15, see discussion supra note 182 and accompanying text.
248. Postanovlenie Prezidiuma Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF ot 5 avgusta 1997 g.
N 1509/97, available at http://arbitr.garant.ru/public/default.asp?no 12003127&
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Meanwhile, as a matter of constitutional law, the CC in 2003 declared
that Article 45(2) of the Constitution guarantees legal persons the right to
pursue the moral damages remedy.2 49 After Shlafman, and relying heav-
ily on it, the Arbitrazh courts granted moral damages to the plaintiff bank
(a legal person) in the Alfa-Bank v. Kommersant litigation. 50
In making these decisions, the various Russian courts did not examine
the possible effect of the ECtHR's Article 10 practice on the legal per-
sons question. Perhaps the ECtHR's pending admissibility decision re-
garding the Kommersant application will provide some insight into the
ECtHR's view on this matter.2 5' Meanwhile, however, under the "take
into account" requirement, the SC might wish to consider the application
of a position that the ECtHR has articulated in two decisions regarding
the conformity of domestic court damages awards in defamation cases.
bodycontext=%E4%E5%EB%EE%E2%EE%E9+%FO%E5%EF%F3%F2%EO%F6%E8
%E8+#gprc0000000l; Postanovlenie Prezidiuma Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF ot
24 Fevralia 1998 g. N 1785/97, available at htp://arbitr.garant.ru/public/
default.asp?no = 12011373; Postanovlenie Prezidiuma Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF
ot I dekabria 1998 g. N 813/98, available at http://arbitr.garant.ru/public/default.asp?
no=12014265&bodycontext=%E4%E5%EB%EE%E2%EE%E9+%FO%E5%EF%F3%
F2%E0%F6%E8%E+#gprc0000000].
249. Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 4 dekabria 2003 g. N. 508-0 "Ob
otkaze v priniatii k rassmotreniiu zhaloby grazhdanina Shlafmana Vladimira
Arkad'evicha na narushenie ego konstitutsionnykh prav punktom 7 stat ' 152 Grazhdan-
skogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii" [Decision of the Russian Federation Constitutional
Court of December 4, 2003 "On denial of admission of the complaint of citizen Vladimir
Arkad'evich Shlafman concerning violation of his constitutional rights by Article 152(7)
of the Russian Federation Civil Code], VKS, Mar. 2004), at 55, available at
http://www.ksrf.ru:808 1/SESSION/S PL5va84h/PILOT/main.htm
Article 45(2) states in full: "Everyone shall have the right to defend his or her
rights and freedoms by any means not prohibited by law." Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Fed-
eratsii (Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 45(2), translated in BURNHAM ET AL., supra note
14, at 646. The CC's determination was made in a decision finding inadmissible an indi-
vidual complaint that claimed that Article 152, as construed by the ordinary courts, was
unconstitutional. The applicant did not include Article 29 of the Constitution among his
grounds for the claim of unconstitutionality. The CC relied heavily on an ECtHR deci-
sion, Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal, in which the ECtHR ruled that a legal person has
standing to seek a monetary remedy for non-economic harm sustained because of a civil
process that exceeded permissible limits under Article 6 of the ECtHR. Comingersoll
S.A. v. Portugal, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 365 paras. 34-35. For analysis of the Shlaf-
man decision, see Sergei Kuzin, Spory vokrug reputatsii [Disputes about reputation],
http://www.eurolawco.ru/publ/review_153.html; A. Erdelevskii, 0 podkhode Konstitut-
sionnogo Suda RF k zashchite delovoi reputatsii iuridicheskikh lits [The Russian Federa-
tion Constitutional Court's Approach to the Protection of Legal Persons 'Business Repu-
tation], KHOZ. I PRAVO, Apr. 2005, at 111-16.
250. See discussion supra note 26.
251. Id.
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In Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom and Steel & Morris v. United
Kingdom, the ECtHR stated that an award of damages for defamation
must "bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the injury to
reputation suffered.
252
The ECtHR's position provides a different perspective from which to
view the legal person question. Rather than the pure statutory construc-
tion approach employed by the High Arbitrazh Court in the late 1990s
and by the SC, it interjects the ECtHR's proportionality principle based
on the "necessary in a democratic society" element of ECHR Article
10(2). If the SC (or the Supreme Arbitrazh Court) were to internalize this
position, it would require the court to examine whether a legal person has
the capacity to experience the kind of harm that would sustain a damages
award consistent with the ECtHR's standard. This perspective also would
serve as a further consideration in the statutory construction of Article
152.253
c. State Agency as Plaintiff
In a number of cases, the defamation plaintiffs include state or munici-
pal bodies, which as legal persons are viewed as having standing to seek
recourse against harm to their business reputations. 254 For example, in
two cases, local government administrations (as legal persons) and their
chief administrators were plaintiffs in disputes in which local newspapers
were among the defendants for having published critical statements. 5 In
another, a city administration (the city of Ekaterinburg) was the sole
plaintiff in a suit against an interviewee and the newspaper which pub-
lished his remarks critical of the administration.
25 6
The SC did not address this question in the 2005 Explanation. Mean-
while, at least one former defendant in the Russian courts has filed an
application at the ECtHR, arguing that the Russian courts' finding of fi-
252. Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, 316 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51, 75 (1995); Steel &
Morris v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 22 (2005), para. 96. Neither of these cases
involved mass media defendants. However, it is doubtful that this is a material difference,
given the overall tenor of the ECtHR's Article 10 jurisprudence.
253. It is conceivable that if the ordinary courts were to take such an approach,
grounded in part on Article 10, that the CC would view this as running counter to its posi-
tion in the Shlafman decision, which was based on the Constitution. See Kuzin, supra
note 249 and accompanying text. This would raise a number of legal issues, including the
competencies of the respective courts and the hierarchy of external norms.
254. See Potapenko 2005, supra note 39, at 2; Fedotov, supra note 123.
255. Riazan' (Feb. 24, 2005), supra note 145; Amur (Apr. 15, 2004), supra note 145.
256. Sverdlovsk (June 1, 2004), supra note 145.
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ability in such circumstances was a violation of Article 10. The ECtHR
found the application admissible on November 17, 2005.257
Opposition to the standing of public bodies as defamation plaintiffs is
based on public interest considerations-that such a capacity provides an
opportunity for a public entity to exercise a chilling effect over criticism,
particularly in the mass media, not even of individual public officials, but
of governmental institutions themselves. In addition, the argument is
made that governmental bodies cannot possess a "reputation" compara-
ble to the reputational interests of individual physical and legal per-
sons.
2 58
The matter of public bodies as defamation plaintiffs bears certain simi-
larities to the question of a legal person's eligibility for monetary com-
pensation for non-economic harm to its reputation. In both cases, under
the autonomy principle, they are solely matters of statutory interpreta-
tion. The question then arises, under the plurality principle and the SC's
"take into account" standard, whether these questions would be viewed
any differently through the prism of Article 10 and ECtHR practice. In
contrast to the legal persons question, where one quite explicit ECtHR
position might be relevant, it appears that, regarding public bodies as
plaintiffs, the potentially relevant ECtHR practice lies in a cluster of
more abstract public interest considerations, many of which go back to
their initial articulation in Lingens v. Austria.259 These center on the role
in democratic governance of critical comment and reporting on public
affairs and the proposition that public authorities must tolerate more
criticism than private persons.
If the SC and the lower courts were to undertake this analysis and
agree with it at least in part, they would then face the question of what to
do about it under the "avoidance of violation" approach. One of the
lower courts already has addressed this question (while not explicitly
citing Article 10 in this regard). In its April 15, 2004 decision, the
Ivanovskii Raion Court of Amur Province dismissed the administration's
complaint, holding that "a municipal organ is not a bearer of business
257. Romanenko & Others v. Russia, App. No. 11751/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). In the
interest of full disclosure, it must be said that the author of this article served as a co-
author of comments on admissibility that were filed with the ECtHR in July 2005.
258. See, e.g., Honouring of Obligations, supra note 7, paras. 392-93.
259. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11 (1986), paras. 41 ("Freedom of
expression ... constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society.") &
42 (Freedom of the press "affords the public one of the best means of discovering and
forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders" and "freedom of politi-
cal debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society.").
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,1260reputation and does not have a right to demand its judicial protection.
This was a narrow construction of the applicable statute-Article 152-
and was consistent with the canon of construction approach in the SC's
"take into account" directive.
d. Insult
Strictly speaking, the civil offense of insult is not a matter of defama-
tion law: it dictates liability for negative appraisals of an individual ex-
pressed in an "indecent" form, not for communications that harm reputa-
tion through dissemination of false factual allegations. Unlike defama-
tion, where the truth of the communication is a complete defense, there
are not any affirmative defenses to a claim of insult. 6' However, as the
2005 Explanation demonstrates, insult and defamation are closely re-
lated. While opinion statements are generally to be excluded from liabil-
ity in defamation questions, the court may find a violation if the im-
pugned communication falls within the definition of insult in Article 130
of the Criminal Code.262 In this regard, insult is a continuation of the de-
bate over whether a legal distinction should be made between statements
of fact and those of opinion. In Russia, opponents of such a distinction
long have sought to make all defamatory communications subject to li-
ability unless proven to be factually correct. It is likely that now this de-
bate will shift from strict defamation to insult because of the ordinary
courts' narrowing of "defamatory meaning" and the SC's general insula-
tion of opinion statements from liability.
Viewed from the perspective of the "take into account" requirement,
insult presents a number of questions. The first is the absence of clarity.
In addition to the applicant's argument in the Chemodurov case before
the ECtHR concerning the absence of definition in the Civil Code, the
SC has blurred the distinctions between insult and defamation by citing
the former's protection of reputational interests. 63 Particularly because
260. Amur (Apr. 15, 2004), supra note 145.
261. See also supra notes I and 83 and accompanying text. An example of a court's
finding of insult is found in the Russian first-instance court's 2000 determination in
Chemodurov v. Russia, App. No. 72683/01, Eur. Ct. H.R (2005). The impugned commu-
nication was a statement in a newspaper article that a provincial governor's rendering of
advice to his aides on a budgetary matter was "abnormal." The court, in a determination
upheld on appeal, concluded that the use of the word "abnormal" referred to the gover-
nor's personality and not his conduct, and therefore was expressed in an insulting form.
Chemodurov v. Russia, App. No. 72683/01, Eur. Ct. H.R (2005).
262. 2005 Explanation, supra note 2, § 9, para. 6. See discussion supra notes 83, 170-
71 and accompanying text.
263. See discussion supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs often ground their complaints in both defamation and insult, the
SC should take steps to clarify the nature of the insult offense and its ap-
plication.
Beyond this is the question of the applicability of Article 10. It is diffi-
cult to determine whether the SC views application of the insult offense
as an interference, triggering the plurality principle, or whether purport-
edly insulting communications are subject to the autonomy principle.
Perhaps the applicability of Article 10 may be inferred from the SC's
inclusion of its brief insult discussion within the general framework of
Article 9 and the entire 2005 Explanation. Meanwhile, it also should be
noted that in Chemodurov, the ECtHR has admitted an application di-
rected against Russia's treatment of the insult offense. In opposing the
application, the Russian government nevertheless acknowledged that
Russia's action was an Article 10 interference.264
Therefore, there is good reason to assume that the SC would find that
the plurality principle applies. However, the ECtHR's positions in this
area are somewhat inconclusive. It is clear that the ECtHR maintains its
specific position, first articulated in Lingens, against requiring the defen-
dant to prove the truth of an opinion statement. In the area of insult, this
is consistent with the proposition that the truth or falsity of such a state-
ment is not at issue. On the other hand, the ECtHR's practice also fre-
quently employs a position apparently borrowed from the United King-
dom's "fair comment" doctrine: that under Article 10 the validity of an
interference "may depend on whether there exists a sufficient factual ba-
sis for the impugned statement, since even a value judgment without any
factual basis to support it may be excessive." '265 The ECtHR takes this
"sufficient factual basis" factor into account as part of its proportionality
analysis, 266 an exercise which in each discrete case is very fact-intensive.
Thus, in this approach, the ECtHR strongly suggests that inquiry into the
facts underlying the statement of opinion indeed can be relevant in decid-
ing whether there has been a violation in insult cases.26 7
Meanwhile, however, the ECtHR also has applied a public interest
component into its general treatment of statements of opinion. In Grin-
berg v. Russia, for example, the Court noted that, in addition to the fact
that "[t]he facts which gave rise to the criticism were not contested," the
"contested statement was made in the context of an article concerning an
issue of public interest" (that of freedom of the media in the region) and
264. Chemodurov v. Russia, App. No. 72683/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
265. Busuioc v. Moldova, App. No. 61513/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 61 (2004) (citation
omitted).
266. Id.
267. Id (citing earlier ECtHR decisions).
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"criticised the conduct of the regional governor, elected by a popular
vote-in other words, a professional politician in respect of whom the
limits of acceptable criticism are wider than in the case of a private indi-
vidual. 268 It must be noted, however, that the ECtHR added to these
considerations its conclusion that the applicant had "expressed his view
in an inoffensive manner., 269 This suggests that the weight of the public
interest considerations might have been reduced if the communication
had been expressed in an insulting form.2 70 Nevertheless, it is apparent
that these factors should receive some consideration.
The SC has not introduced public interest considerations into the insult
context. Here, due to the nature of the ECtHR's practice, it is unclear
whether Russia would face a significant risk of violation in continuing to
apply the insult offense in the way that it has. At the same time, however,
the ordinary courts still should consider the introduction of public inter-
est considerations in this area. Certainly, in light of the "take into ac-
count" standard, the courts should strongly consider the fundamental po-
sitions articulated, for example, in the Lingens line of cases: that public
officials must tolerate greater criticism than private individuals in regard
to critical communications on matters of public interest. Such an ap-
proach in itself would lend more certainty to resolution of future dis-
putes; in addition, perhaps the application of public interest notions
would help to bridge the long-standing divide between the supporters and
opponents of the fact/opinion distinction, by giving the latter some com-
fort that Article 10 and other external norms will not be used to categori-
cally deny recourse to private individuals suffering perceived injury from
insulting statements.
VII. CONCLUSION
As far back as 1999, the late Dr. Gennady Danilenko predicted that at
some point Russia's courts might gradually transform the ECtHR's case
law into Russian domestic jurisprudence. 271 The study in this Article
272shows that this prediction was remarkably prescient. Now, with the
benefit of hindsight, we can see not only that this process has begun to
take place, but how it is taking place.
268. Grinberg v. Russia, App. No. 23472/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), para. 32.
269. Id.
270. The ECtHR never has taken a categorical position, for example, that Article 10 in
all circumstances blocks a public official from pursuing legal recourse for purportedly
insulting statements. This is why the cases are decided pursuant to fact-intensive propor-
tionality analysis. See generally Kozlowski, supra note 51.
271. Danilenko, Implementation of International Law, supra note 6, at 68.
272. See also Maggs, supra note 39, at 482.
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While the ordinary court system encompasses the vast majority of Rus-
sia's courts and is the main concern of this Article, the potential radiating
effect of the ordinary courts' practice to the Arbitrazh courts and the CC
is still an open question. Although the Arbitrazh courts hear a smaller
number of defamation disputes than do the ordinary courts, the cases
they do hear can be highly visible because of high awards of monetary
compensation. At this point, the Arbitrazh courts have not directly ad-
dressed the sources of law question and have not considered the applica-
bility of ECtHR practice in this area. It is quite possible that the ECtHR's
handling of the Kommersant application, whatever the ECtHR decides,
will be significant in assessing whether the Arbitrazh courts will continue
with their present approach or consider revisions along the lines of those
that the ordinary courts have undertaken.
The situation regarding the CC, meanwhile, is even more complex. The
Court's Article 29 jurisprudence is not extensive, although in one area-
the constitutionality of legislation regulating expressive activity in elec-
tion campaigns-it has received considerable attention in a number of
recent decisions. 273 Given the CC's lack of active engagement, ECHR
Article 10 has become a far more influential source of law in defamation
than has Article 29, which has long lain dormant in this area. For the
long term, this imbalance is not a good thing. Perhaps the initial steps
taken by the ordinary courts will stimulate new assessment of the place
of Article 29 in Russia's constitutional law.
Meanwhile, as to the ordinary courts, this study to some extent dispels
the more extreme popular image of these courts as unreceptive to new
ideas. Indeed, as some of the lower court decisions demonstrate, judges
in the provinces can be quite receptive to new theories. In this regard, it
might be tempting to view the 2005 Explanation as a knee-jerk, panicked
reaction to the ECtHR's pending Grinberg decision and the 2004 admis-
sibility decisions. However, the steps examined in this Article did not
happen overnight. At the SC, they can be traced back at least as far as the
adoption of the October 10, 2003 Explanation, and earlier in the case of
some lower courts.
Because of the implications of the "take into account" directive, the
2005 Explanation might have significant impact on the nature of legal
analysis and argument in Russia. While it certainly is too early to tell,
273. Decrees dated Oct. 30, 2003, Vestnik Konstitusionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federat-
sii [VKS] [The Russian Federation Constitutional Court Reporter] 2003, no. 6, p. 3; Nov.
3, 2003, Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 44, Item 4358; Nov. 14, 2005, VKS 2006, No. 1, p.
3; November 21,2005, SZ RF 2005, No. 47, item 4968; June 16, 2006, SZ RF 2006, No.
27, Item 2970.
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perhaps in the long term it will have an impact on the broad political
trends affecting press freedoms in Russia as well. Meanwhile, in contrast
to the public expressions of concern about restrictions on press freedoms,
the Russian legal academy does not appear to have engaged in significant
open discussion or debate about these matters. Perhaps this is because
press freedom in Russia is to a considerable extent viewed not as a legal
or constitutional issue, but as a purely political issue. Certainly much of
this must be traced back to lack of confidence in the courts among many
press freedom advocates. Perhaps the developments examined in this
Article will be an incipient step toward greater balance on these percep-
tions.
These thoughts certainly apply to Russia's external image as well. Rus-
sia joined the Council of Europe amid great skepticism, and criticism
continues to this day, as reflected in recent Council of Europe actions
such as the June 2005 PACE report.2 74 However, in at least the narrow
area of civil defamation, perhaps the in-bound aspect of the ECHR sys-
tem is starting to take hold. In the end, these steps by the ordinary courts
show that they have crossed the line from simple compliance with
ECtHR judgments where Russia is a party, to the far broader and more
significant goal of compliance with the obligation to respect the ECHR's
norms within its jurisdiction.275 In other words, the Russian ordinary
courts, with the SC taking the lead, have determined that the policing of
Russia's ECHR compliance will take place within Russia's legal system
without sole reliance on the Strasbourg Court's supervision.
Despite the emphasis in this Article on rules and positions, the devel-
opments examined here in the end are more about method-examination
of diverse means of viewing complex legal questions-than about spe-
cific rules. In this author's view, this is a positive thing: the notion of
strict adherence to explicit ECtHR positions has its limits. 276 For one
thing, the scope of questions that the ECtHR has addressed is limited by
its function. Civil defamation, while it has been a particularly contentious
field, is but one of many elements of the larger body of law that relates to
freedom of speech and freedom of the press in Russia. Many, many other
issues remain untouched by the type of analysis initiated by the ordinary
courts in civil defamation-broadcast ownership and control and licens-
ing, freedom of information, and criminal defamation, to identify several
274. Honouring of Obligations, supra note 7.
275. ECHR, supra note 3, art. 1.
276. Regarding the risks of a "compatibility-only" approach to ECHR rights, see Roger
Masterman, Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a 'Municipal




examples. Therefore, an over-emphasis on the ECtHR's perceived pre-
eminent authority could serve as a disincentive to the Russian courts'
development of the Russian Constitution,27 7 and in particular methodo-
logical inquiries into the free expression provisions of Article 29, which
ultimately must be seen as relevant to these questions.278 Perhaps spurred
by the evident normative similarities with Article 10, the provisions of
Article 29 are being cited with more regularity than before in the Russian
courts, 279 but without the far greater attention paid to Article 10 and the
ECtHR.2 '0 At its best, at some point, the developing applications of Arti-
cle 10 will begin to merge with increased analysis of what should be its
normative counterpart in Article 29. Ultimately, this would be the ful-
fillment of the goals of domestic incorporation and implementation envi-
sioned in Article 1 of the ECHR.
277. But see Danilenko, Implementation ofInternational Law, supra note 6, at 62 (re-
garding the courts' reliance in states of the former USSR on international law as an addi-
tional argument in support of their conclusions based on interpretation of constitutional
provisions).
278. For discussion of Articles 10 and 29 (postulating that the latter should be
broader), see lu. Shul'zhenko, Standarty Soveta Evropy v oblasti SM1 i rossiiskaia deist-
viel 'nost' [Standards of the Council of Europe in the sphere of mass information media
and Russian reality], ROSSUISKAIA IUSTITS[[A, May 1999, at 8.
279. It is noteworthy that the crucial section 9 of the 2005 Explanation, supra note 2,
identifies both Articles 10 and 29, but then goes on to cite and apply the "Position" of the
ECtHR concerning the fact/opinion distinction.
280. For further discussion, see Golovanov & Potapenko 2005, supra note 68, at 5.
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